Sophie

Sophie

distrib > Fedora > 15 > i386 > by-pkgid > 6e152889deff84d36ff414c0398b7dc5 > files > 78

mod_security-2.5.12-4.fc15.i686.rpm

<html><head><META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"><title>ModSecurity&reg; Reference
  Manual</title><link href="modsecurity-reference.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><meta content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.69.1" name="generator"><link rel="start" href="#N10001" title="ModSecurity&reg; Reference
  Manual"><link rel="next" href="#introduction" title="Introduction"></head><body bgcolor="white" text="black" link="#0000FF" vlink="#840084" alink="#0000FF"><div style="background:#F5F5F5;width:100%;border-top:1px solid #DDDDDD;border-bottom:1px solid #DDDDDD"><table width="100%" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"><tr><td><a href="http://www.modsecurity.org"><img style="margin:4px" src="modsecurity.gif" width="120" height="36" alt="ModSecurity" border="0"></a></td><td align="right"><a href="http://www.breach.com"><img style="margin:6px" src="breach-logo-small.gif" height="36" width="100" border="0"></a></td></tr></table></div><div class="article" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="N10001"></a><span class="trademark">ModSecurity</span>&reg; Reference
  Manual</h2></div><div><p class="releaseinfo">Version 2.5.12 (Feb 3, 2010)</p></div><div><p class="copyright">Copyright &copy; 2004-2010 Breach Security, Inc. (<a href="http://www.breach.com" target="_top">http://www.breach.com</a>)</p></div></div><div></div><hr size="1"></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Table of Contents</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#introduction">Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1001D">HTTP Traffic Logging</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10022">Real-Time Monitoring and Attack Detection</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10027">Attack Prevention and Just-in-time Patching</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10038">Flexible Rule Engine</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1003D">Embedded-mode Deployment</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10054">Network-based Deployment</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10059">Portability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#licensing">Licensing</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10067"><span class="trademark">ModSecurity Core Rules</span>&trade;</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1006C">Overview</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10075">Core Rules Content</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#installation">Installation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#configuration-directives">Configuration Directives</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N101B0"><code class="literal">SecAction</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N101E1"><code class="literal">SecArgumentSeparator</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10216"><code class="literal">SecAuditEngine</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10263"><code class="literal">SecAuditLog</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10293"><code class="literal">SecAuditLog2</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N102C5"><code class="literal">SecAuditLogDirMode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N102F3"><code class="literal">SecAuditLogFileMode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10321"><code class="literal">SecAuditLogParts</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N103B4"><code class="literal">SecAuditLogRelevantStatus</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N103E5"><code class="literal">SecAuditLogStorageDir</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1040E"><code class="literal">SecAuditLogType</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1044A"><code class="literal">SecCacheTransformations</code>
      (Deprecated/Experimental)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1049C"><code class="literal">SecChrootDir</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N104DD"><code class="literal">SecComponentSignature</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10504"><code class="literal">SecContentInjection</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10533"><code class="literal">SecCookieFormat</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10569"><code class="literal">SecDataDir</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1058C"><code class="literal">SecDebugLog</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N105B3"><code class="literal">SecDebugLogLevel</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10613"><code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1065E"><code class="literal">SecGeoLookupDb</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10689"><code class="literal">SecGuardianLog</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N106BC"><code class="literal">SecMarker</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N106F4"><code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimit</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10725"><code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimitRecursion</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10756"><code class="literal">SecPdfProtect</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10781"><code class="literal">SecPdfProtectMethod</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N107B7"><code class="literal">SecPdfProtectSecret</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N107DE"><code class="literal">SecPdfProtectTimeout</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1080C"><code class="literal">SecPdfProtectTokenName</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1083A"><code class="literal">SecRequestBodyAccess</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10878"><code class="literal">SecRequestBodyLimit</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1089B"><code class="literal">SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N108C6"><code class="literal">SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N108F2"><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyLimit</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1091E"><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyLimitAction</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10949"><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyMimeType</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10985"><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyMimeTypesClear</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N109B0"><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyAccess</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N109E6"><code class="literal">SecRule</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10AD6"><code class="literal">SecRuleInheritance</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10B39"><code class="literal">SecRuleEngine</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10B75"><code class="literal">SecRuleRemoveById</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10B9F"><code class="literal">SecRuleRemoveByMsg</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10BCA"><code class="literal">SecRuleScript</code> (Experimental)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10C24"><code class="literal">SecRuleUpdateActionById</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10C53"><code class="literal">SecServerSignature</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10C7A"><code class="literal">SecTmpDir</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10CA1"><code class="literal">SecUploadDir</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10CD0"><code class="literal">SecUploadFileLimit</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10D12"><code class="literal">SecUploadFileMode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10D3C"><code class="literal">SecUploadKeepFiles</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10D7C"><code class="literal">SecWebAppId</code></a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#processing-phases">Processing Phases</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10E17">Phase Request Headers</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10E21">Phase Request Body</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10E3B">Phase Response Headers</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10E40">Phase Response Body</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10E45">Phase Logging</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#variables">Variables</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10E50"><code class="literal">ARGS</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10EA2"><code class="literal">ARGS_COMBINED_SIZE</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10EAF"><code class="literal">ARGS_NAMES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10EBC"><code class="literal">ARGS_GET</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10ECA"><code class="literal">ARGS_GET_NAMES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10ED8"><code class="literal">ARGS_POST</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10EE6"><code class="literal">ARGS_POST_NAMES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10EF4"><code class="literal">AUTH_TYPE</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10F0A"><code class="literal">ENV</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10F1E"><code class="literal">FILES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10F2B"><code class="literal">FILES_COMBINED_SIZE</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10F38"><code class="literal">FILES_NAMES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10F45"><code class="literal">FILES_SIZES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10F52"><code class="literal">FILES_TMPNAMES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10F63"><code class="literal">GEO</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10FB5"><code class="literal">HIGHEST_SEVERITY</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10FC8"><code class="literal">MATCHED_VAR</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10FD9"><code class="literal">MATCHED_VAR_NAME</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10FE6"><code class="literal">MODSEC_BUILD</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N10FF3"><code class="literal">MULTIPART_CRLF_LF_LINES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1101E"><code class="literal">MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11072"><code class="literal">MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11088"><code class="literal">PATH_INFO</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11095"><code class="literal">QUERY_STRING</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N110A2"><code class="literal">REMOTE_ADDR</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N110AF"><code class="literal">REMOTE_HOST</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N110BC"><code class="literal">REMOTE_PORT</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N110CD"><code class="literal">REMOTE_USER</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N110DF"><code class="literal">REQBODY_PROCESSOR</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N110F8"><code class="literal">REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11110"><code class="literal">REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR_MSG</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1111D"><code class="literal">REQUEST_BASENAME</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1113F"><code class="literal">REQUEST_BODY</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11173"><code class="literal">REQUEST_COOKIES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11180"><code class="literal">REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1118D"><code class="literal">REQUEST_FILENAME</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N111A9"><code class="literal">REQUEST_HEADERS</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N111CD"><code class="literal">REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N111DA"><code class="literal">REQUEST_LINE</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N111E7"><code class="literal">REQUEST_METHOD</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N111FA"><code class="literal">REQUEST_PROTOCOL</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11207"><code class="literal">REQUEST_URI</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11225"><code class="literal">REQUEST_URI_RAW</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1123F"><code class="literal">RESPONSE_BODY</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1124E"><code class="literal">RESPONSE_CONTENT_LENGTH</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1125F"><code class="literal">RESPONSE_CONTENT_TYPE</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11266"><code class="literal">RESPONSE_HEADERS</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1127A"><code class="literal">RESPONSE_HEADERS_NAMES</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1128C"><code class="literal">RESPONSE_PROTOCOL</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11299"><code class="literal">RESPONSE_STATUS</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N112AB"><code class="literal">RULE</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N112D0"><code class="literal">SCRIPT_BASENAME</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N112E2"><code class="literal">SCRIPT_FILENAME</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N112F4"><code class="literal">SCRIPT_GID</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11306"><code class="literal">SCRIPT_GROUPNAME</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11318"><code class="literal">SCRIPT_MODE</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1132A"><code class="literal">SCRIPT_UID</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1133C"><code class="literal">SCRIPT_USERNAME</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1134E"><code class="literal">SERVER_ADDR</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1135B"><code class="literal">SERVER_NAME</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1136D"><code class="literal">SERVER_PORT</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1137A"><code class="literal">SESSION</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11394"><code class="literal">SESSIONID</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N113A5"><code class="literal">TIME</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N113B2"><code class="literal">TIME_DAY</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N113BF"><code class="literal">TIME_EPOCH</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N113CC"><code class="literal">TIME_HOUR</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N113D9"><code class="literal">TIME_MIN</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N113E6"><code class="literal">TIME_MON</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N113F3"><code class="literal">TIME_SEC</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11400"><code class="literal">TIME_WDAY</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1140D"><code class="literal">TIME_YEAR</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1141A"><code class="literal">TX</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11462"><code class="literal">USERID</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11473"><code class="literal">WEBAPPID</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11484"><code class="literal">WEBSERVER_ERROR_LOG</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11491"><code class="literal">XML</code></a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#transformation-functions">Transformation functions</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N114EE"><code class="literal">base64Decode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N114F5"><code class="literal">base64Encode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N114FC"><code class="literal">compressWhitespace</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11503">cssDecode</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11514"><code class="literal">escapeSeqDecode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1154F"><code class="literal">hexDecode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11556"><code class="literal">hexEncode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1155D"><code class="literal">htmlEntityDecode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1159F"><code class="literal">jsDecode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115B2"><code class="literal">length</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115B9"><code class="literal">lowercase</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115C0"><code class="literal">md5</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115CB"><code class="literal"><code class="literal">none</code></code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115D4"><code class="literal">normalisePath</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115DB"><code class="literal">normalisePathWin</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115E6"><code class="literal">parityEven7bit</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115ED"><code class="literal">parityOdd7bit</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115F4"><code class="literal">parityZero7bit</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N115FB"><code class="literal">removeNulls</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11602"><code class="literal">removeWhitespace</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11609"><code class="literal">replaceComments</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11618"><code class="literal">replaceNulls</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1161F"><code class="literal">urlDecode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1162A"><code class="literal">urlDecodeUni</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11645"><code class="literal">urlEncode</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1164C"><code class="literal">sha1</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11657"><code class="literal">trimLeft</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1165E"><code class="literal">trimRight</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11665"><code class="literal">trim</code></a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#actions">Actions</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N116AD"><code class="literal">allow</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N116FD">append</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1171F"><code class="literal">auditlog</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11739"><code class="literal">block</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1177E"><code class="literal">capture</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11798"><code class="literal">chain</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N117B3"><code class="literal">ctl</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11847"><code class="literal">deny</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1185C"><code class="literal">deprecatevar</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11873"><code class="literal">drop</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1188D"><code class="literal">exec</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N118B6"><code class="literal">expirevar</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N118D0"><code class="literal">id</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11912"><code class="literal">initcol</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11939"><code class="literal">log</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11952"><code class="literal">logdata</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N1196B"><code class="literal">msg</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11987"><code class="literal">multiMatch</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N119A0"><code class="literal">noauditlog</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N119BD"><code class="literal">nolog</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N119D6"><code class="literal">pass</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11A05"><code class="literal">pause</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11A1E"><code class="literal">phase</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11A38">prepend</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11A5A"><code class="literal">proxy</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11A73"><code class="literal">redirect</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11A90"><code class="literal">rev</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11AAE"><code class="literal">sanitiseArg</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11AC7"><code class="literal">sanitiseMatched</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11AE3"><code class="literal">sanitiseRequestHeader</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11AFC"><code class="literal">sanitiseResponseHeader</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11B15"><code class="literal">severity</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11B4A"><code class="literal">setuid</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11B6C"><code class="literal">setsid</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11B91"><code class="literal">setenv</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11BB3"><code class="literal">setvar</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11BD9"><code class="literal">skip</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11BF4"><code class="literal">skipAfter</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11C16"><code class="literal">status</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11C38"><code class="literal">t</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11C51"><code class="literal">tag</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11C6B"><code class="literal">xmlns</code></a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#operators">Operators</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11C8A"><code class="literal">beginsWith</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11CA2"><code class="literal">contains</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11CB6"><code class="literal">endsWith</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11CCA"><code class="literal">eq</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11CE1"><code class="literal">ge</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11CF8"><code class="literal">geoLookup</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11D21"><code class="literal">gt</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11D38"><code class="literal">inspectFile</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11D5A"><code class="literal">le</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11D71"><code class="literal">lt</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11D88"><code class="literal">pm</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11D9B"><code class="literal">pmFromFile</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11DCA"><code class="literal">rbl</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11DDB"><code class="literal">rx</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11E15"><code class="literal">streq</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11E29"><code class="literal">validateByteRange</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11E4F"><code class="literal">validateDTD</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11E63"><code class="literal">validateSchema</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11E77"><code class="literal">validateUrlEncoding</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11E91"><code class="literal">validateUtf8Encoding</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11EB3"><code class="literal">verifyCC</code></a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11EC4"><code class="literal">within</code></a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11EDC">Macro Expansion</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11EEA">Persistant Storage</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11F4E">Miscellaneous Topics</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#N11F52">Impedance Mismatch</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="introduction"></a>Introduction</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>ModSecurity is a web application firewall (WAF). With over 70% of
    attacks now carried out over the web application level, organisations need
    all the help they can get in making their systems secure. WAFs are
    deployed to establish an increased external security layer to detect
    and/or prevent attacks before they reach web applications. ModSecurity
    provides protection from a range of attacks against web applications and
    allows for HTTP traffic monitoring and real-time analysis with little or
    no changes to existing infrastructure.</p><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1001D"></a>HTTP Traffic Logging</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Web servers are typically well-equipped to log traffic in a form
      useful for marketing analyses, but fall short logging traffic to web
      applications. In particular, most are not capable of logging the request
      bodies. Your adversaries know this, and that is why most attacks are now
      carried out via POST requests, rendering your systems blind. ModSecurity
      makes full HTTP transaction logging possible, allowing complete requests
      and responses to be logged. Its logging facilities also allow
      fine-grained decisions to be made about exactly what is logged and when,
      ensuring only the relevant data is recorded. As some of the request
      and/or response may contain sensitive data in certain fields,
      ModSecurity can be configured to mask these fields before they are
      written to the audit log.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10022"></a>Real-Time Monitoring and Attack Detection</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>In addition to providing logging facilities, ModSecurity can
      monitor the HTTP traffic in real time in order to detect attacks. In
      this case, ModSecurity operates as a web intrusion detection tool,
      allowing you to react to suspicious events that take place at your web
      systems.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10027"></a>Attack Prevention and Just-in-time Patching</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>ModSecurity can also act immediately to prevent attacks from
      reaching your web applications. There are three commonly used
      approaches:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>Negative security model. A negative security model monitors
          requests for anomalies, unusual behaviour, and common web
          application attacks. It keeps anomaly scores for each request, IP
          addresses, application sessions, and user accounts. Requests with
          high anomaly scores are either logged or rejected altogether.</p></li><li><p>Positive security model. When a positive security model is
          deployed, only requests that are known to be valid are accepted,
          with everything else rejected. This model requires knownledge of the
          web applications you are protecting. Therefore a positive security
          model works best with applications that are heavily used but rarely
          updated so that maintenance of the model is minimized.</p></li><li><p>Known weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Its rule language makes
          ModSecurity an ideal external patching tool. External patching
          (sometimes referred to as Virtual Patching) is about reducing the
          window of opportunity. Time needed to patch application
          vulnerabilities often runs to weeks in many organisations. With
          ModSecurity, applications can be patched from the outside, without
          touching the application source code (and even without any access to
          it), making your systems secure until a proper patch is applied to
          the application.</p></li></ol></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10038"></a>Flexible Rule Engine</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>A flexible rule engine sits in the heart of ModSecurity. It
      implements the ModSecurity Rule Language, which is a specialised
      programming language designed to work with HTTP transaction data. The
      ModSecurity Rule Language is designed to be easy to use, yet flexible:
      common operations are simple while complex operations are possible.
      Certified ModSecurity Rules, included with ModSecurity, contain a
      comprehensive set of rules that implement general-purpose hardening,
      protocol validation and detection of common web application security
      issues. Heavily commented, these rules can be used as a learning
      tool.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1003D"></a>Embedded-mode Deployment</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>ModSecurity is an embeddable web application firewall, which means
      it can be deployed as part of your existing web server infrastructure
      provided your web servers are Apache-based. This deployment method has
      certain advantages:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>No changes to existing network. It only takes a few minutes to
          add ModSecurity to your existing web servers. And because it was
          designed to be completely passive by default, you are free to deploy
          it incrementally and only use the features you need. It is equally
          easy to remove or deactivate it if required.</p></li><li><p>No single point of failure. Unlike with network-based
          deployments, you will not be introducing a new point of failure to
          your system.</p></li><li><p>Implicit load balancing and scaling. Because it works embedded
          in web servers, ModSecurity will automatically take advantage of the
          additional load balancing and scalability features. You will not
          need to think of load balancing and scaling unless your existing
          system needs them.</p></li><li><p>Minimal overhead. Because it works from inside the web server
          process there is no overhead for network communication and minimal
          overhead in parsing and data exchange.</p></li><li><p>No problem with encrypted or compressed content. Many IDS
          systems have difficulties analysing SSL traffic. This is not a
          problem for ModSecurity because it is positioned to work when the
          traffic is decrypted and decompressed.</p></li></ol></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10054"></a>Network-based Deployment</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>ModSecurity works equally well when deployed as part of an
      Apache-based reverse proxy server, and many of our customers choose to
      do so. In this scenario, one installation of ModSecurity can protect any
      number of web servers (even the non-Apache ones).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10059"></a>Portability</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>ModSecurity is known to work well on a wide range of operating
      systems. Our customers are successfully running it on Linux, Windows,
      Solaris, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, AIX, Mac OS X, and HP-UX.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="licensing"></a>Licensing</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>ModSecurity is available under two licenses. Users can choose to
      use the software under the terms of the GNU General Public License
      version 2 (licence text is included with the distribution), as an Open
      Source / Free Software product. A range of commercial licenses is also
      available, together with a range of commercial support contracts. For
      more information on commercial licensing please contact Breach
      Security.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>ModSecurity, mod_security, ModSecurity Pro, and ModSecurity Core
        Rules are trademarks or registered trademarks of Breach Security,
        Inc.</p></div></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="N10067"></a><span class="trademark">ModSecurity Core Rules</span>&trade;</h2></div></div><div></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1006C"></a>Overview</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>ModSecurity is a web application firewall engine that provides
      very little protection on its own. In order to become useful,
      ModSecurity must be configured with rules. In order to enable users to
      take full advantage of ModSecurity out of the box, Breach Security, Inc.
      is providing a free certified rule set for ModSecurity 2.x. Unlike
      intrusion detection and prevention systems, which rely on signatures
      specific to known vulnerabilities, the Core Rules provide generic
      protection from unknown vulnerabilities often found in web applications,
      which are in most cases custom coded. The Core Rules are heavily
      commented to allow it to be used as a step-by-step deployment guide for
      ModSecurity. The latest Core Rules can be found at the ModSecurity
      website - <a href="http://www.modsecurity.org/projects/rules/" target="_top">http://www.modsecurity.org/projects/rules/</a>.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10075"></a>Core Rules Content</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>In order to provide generic web applications protection, the Core
      Rules use the following techniques:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p>HTTP protection - detecting violations of the HTTP protocol
          and a locally defined usage policy.</p></li><li><p>Common Web Attacks Protection - detecting common web
          application security attack.</p></li><li><p>Automation detection - Detecting bots, crawlers, scanners and
          other surface malicious activity.</p></li><li><p>Trojan Protection - Detecting access to Trojans horses.</p></li><li><p>Error Hiding - Disguising error messages sent by the
          server.</p></li></ul></div></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="installation"></a>Installation</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>ModSecurity installation requirements:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>ModSecurity 2.x works only with Apache 2.0.x or higher. Version
        2.2.x is highly recommended.</p></li><li><p>Make sure you have <code class="literal">mod_unique_id</code> installed.</p><p>mod_unique_id is packaged with Apache httpd.</p></li><li><p>libapr and libapr-util</p><p><a href="http://apr.apache.org/" target="_top">http://apr.apache.org/</a></p></li><li><p>libpcre</p><p><a href="http://www.pcre.org/" target="_top">http://www.pcre.org/</a></p></li><li><p>libxml2</p><p><a href="http://xmlsoft.org/downloads.html" target="_top">http://xmlsoft.org/downloads.html</a></p></li><li><p>liblua v5.1.x</p><p>This library is optional and only needed if you will be using
        the new Lua engine.</p><p><a href="http://www.lua.org/download.html" target="_top">http://www.lua.org/download.html</a></p><p>Note that ModSecurity requires the dynamic libraries. These are
        not built by default in the source distribution, so the binary
        distribution is recommended.</p></li><li><p>libcurl v7.15.1 or higher</p><p>If you will be using the ModSecurity Log Collector (mlogc) to
        send audit logs to a central repository, then you will also need the
        curl library.</p><p><a href="http://curl.haxx.se/libcurl/" target="_top">http://curl.haxx.se/libcurl/</a></p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Many have had issues with libcurl linked with the GnuTLS
          library for SSL/TLS support. It is recommended that the openssl
          library be used for SSL/TLS support in libcurl.</p></div></li></ol></div><p>ModSecurity installation consists of the following steps:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>Stop Apache httpd</p></li><li><p>Unpack the ModSecurity archive</p></li><li><p>Building differs for UNIX (or UNIX-like) operating systems and
        Windows.</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p>UNIX</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="a"><li><p>Run the configure script to generate a Makefile.
                Typically no options are needed.</p><p><code class="literal">./configure</code></p><p>Options are available for more customization (use
                <code class="literal">./configure --help</code> for a full list), but
                typically you will only need to specify the location of the
                <code class="literal">apxs</code> command installed by Apache httpd with
                the <code class="literal">--with-apxs</code> option.</p><p><code class="literal">./configure
                --with-apxs=/path/to/httpd-2.x.y/bin/apxs</code></p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>There are certain configure options that are meant for
                  debugging an other development use. If enabled, these
                  options can substantially impact performance. These options
                  include all <code class="literal">--debug-*</code> options as well as
                  the <code class="literal">--enable-performance-measurements</code>
                  options.</p></div></li><li><p>Compile with: <code class="literal">make</code></p></li><li><p>Optionally test with: <code class="literal">make
                test</code></p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>This is step is still a bit experimental. If you have
                  problems, please send the full output and error from the
                  build to the support list. Most common issues are related to
                  not finding the required headers and/or libraries.</p></div></li><li><p>Optionally build the ModSecurity Log Collector with:
                <code class="literal">make mlogc</code></p></li><li><p>Optionally install <code class="literal">mlogc</code>: Review the
                <code class="literal">INSTALL</code> file included in the
                apache2/mlogc-src directory in the distribution.</p></li><li><p>Install the ModSecurity module with: <code class="literal">make
                install</code></p></li></ol></div></li><li><p>Windows (MS VC++ 8)</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="a"><li><p>Edit <code class="literal">Makefile.win</code> to configure the
                Apache base and library paths.</p></li><li><p>Compile with: <code class="literal">nmake -f
                Makefile.win</code></p></li><li><p>Install the ModSecurity module with: <code class="literal">nmake -f
                Makefile.win install</code></p></li><li><p>Copy the <code class="literal">libxml2.dll</code> and
                <code class="literal">lua5.1.dll</code> to the Apache
                <code class="literal">bin</code> directory. Alternatively you can follow
                the step below for using LoadFile to load these
                libraries.</p></li></ol></div></li></ul></div></li><li><p>Edit the main Apache httpd config file (usually
        <code class="literal">httpd.conf</code>)</p><p>On UNIX (and Windows if you did not copy the DLLs as stated
        above) you must load libxml2 and lua5.1 before ModSecurity with
        something like this:</p><p><pre class="programlisting">LoadFile /usr/lib/libxml2.so
LoadFile /usr/lib/liblua5.1.so</pre></p><p>Load the ModSecurity module with:<pre class="programlisting">LoadModule security2_module modules/mod_security2.so</pre></p></li><li><p>Configure ModSecurity</p></li><li><p>Start Apache httpd</p></li><li><p>You should now have ModSecurity 2.x up and running.</p></li></ol></div><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>If you have compiled Apache yourself you might experience problems
      compiling ModSecurity against PCRE. This is because Apache bundles PCRE
      but this library is also typically provided by the operating system. I
      would expect most (all) vendor-packaged Apache distributions to be
      configured to use an external PCRE library (so this should not be a
      problem).</p><p>You want to avoid Apache using the bundled PCRE library and
      ModSecurity linking against the one provided by the operating system.
      The easiest way to do this is to compile Apache against the PCRE library
      provided by the operating system (or you can compile it against the
      latest PCRE version you downloaded from the main PCRE distribution
      site). You can do this at configure time using the<code class="literal"> --with-pcre</code> switch. If you are not in a
      position to recompile Apache, then, to compile ModSecurity successfully,
      you'd still need to have access to the bundled PCRE headers (they are
      available only in the Apache source code) and change the include path
      for ModSecurity (as you did in step 7 above) to point to them (via the
      <code class="literal">--with-pcre</code> ModSecurity configure option).</p><p>Do note that if your Apache is using an external PCRE library you
      can compile ModSecurity with <code class="literal">WITH_PCRE_STUDY</code> defined,which would possibly
      give you a slight performance edge in regular expression
      processing.</p><p>Non-gcc compilers may have problems running out-of-the-box as the
      current build system was designed around the gcc compiler and some
      compiler/linker flags may differ. To use a non-gcc compiler you may need
      some manual Makefile tweaks if issues cannot be solved by exporting
      custom CFLAGS and CPPFLAGS environment variables.</p><p>If you are upgrading from ModSecurity 1.x, please refer to the
      migration matrix at <a href="http://www.modsecurity.org/documentation/ModSecurity-Migration-Matrix.pdf" target="_top">http://www.modsecurity.org/documentation/ModSecurity-Migration-Matrix.pdf</a></p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="configuration-directives"></a>Configuration Directives</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>The following section outlines all of the ModSecurity directives.
    Most of the ModSecurity directives can be used inside the various Apache
    Scope Directives such as <code class="literal">VirtualHost</code>,
    <code class="literal">Location</code>, <code class="literal">LocationMatch</code>,
    <code class="literal">Directory</code>, etc... There are others, however, that can
    only be used once in the main configuration file. This information is
    specified in the Scope sections below. The first version to use a given
    directive is given in the Version sections below.</p><p>These rules, along with the Core rules files, should be contained is
    files outside of the httpd.conf file and called up with Apache "Include"
    directives. This allows for easier updating/migration of the rules. If you
    create your own custom rules that you would like to use with the Core
    rules, you should create a file called -
    <code class="filename">modsecurity_crs_15_customrules.conf</code> and place it in
    the same directory as the Core rules files. By using this file name, your
    custom rules will be called up after the standard ModSecurity Core rules
    configuration file but before the other Core rules. This allows your rules
    to be evaluated first which can be useful if you need to implement
    specific "allow" rules or to correct any false positives in the Core rules
    as they are applied to your site.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>It is highly encouraged that you do not edit the Core rules files
      themselves but rather place all changes (such as
      <code class="literal">SecRuleRemoveByID</code>, etc...) in your custom rules file.
      This will allow for easier upgrading as newer Core rules are released by
      Breach Security on the ModSecurity website.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N101B0"></a><code class="literal">SecAction</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Unconditionally processes the
      action list it receives as the first and only parameter. It accepts one
      parameter, the syntax of which is identical to the third parameter
      of<code class="literal"> SecRule</code>.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAction
      action1,action2,action3</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAction
      nolog,phase:1,initcol:RESOURCE=%{REQUEST_FILENAME}</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><p>SecAction is best used when you unconditionally execute an action.
      This is explicit triggering whereas the normal Actions are conditional
      based on data inspection of the request/response. This is a useful
      directive when you want to run certain actions such as
      <code class="literal">initcol</code> to initialize collections.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N101E1"></a><code class="literal">SecArgumentSeparator</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Specifies which character to use
      as separator for<code class="literal">
      application/x-www-form-urlencoded</code> content. Defaults to
      <code class="literal">&amp;</code>. Applications are sometimes
      (very rarely) written to use a semicolon (<code class="literal">;</code>).</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecArgumentSeparator character</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecArgumentSeparator ;</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Main</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><p>This directive is needed if a backend web application is using a
      non-standard argument separator. If this directive is not set properly
      for each web application, then ModSecurity will not be able to parse the
      arguments appropriately and the effectiveness of the rule matching will
      be significantly decreased.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10216"></a><code class="literal">SecAuditEngine</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the audit logging
      engine.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditEngine On|Off|RelevantOnly</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditEngine On</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Can be set/changed with
      the "<code class="literal">ctl</code>" action for the current transaction.</p><p>Example: The following example shows the various audit directives
      used together.</p><pre class="programlisting"><span class="emphasis"><em>SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly</em></span> 
SecAuditLog logs/audit/audit.log
SecAuditLogParts ABCFHZ
SecAuditLogType concurrent
SecAuditLogStorageDir logs/audit
<span class="emphasis"><em>SecAuditLogRelevantStatus ^(?:5|4\d[^4])</em></span></pre><p>Possible values are:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">On</code> - log all transactions
          by default.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">Off</code> - do not log
          transactions by default.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">RelevantOnly</code> - by default
          only log transactions that have triggered a warning or an error, or
          have a status code that is considered to be relevant (see<code class="literal"> SecAuditLogRelevantStatus</code>).</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10263"></a><code class="literal">SecAuditLog</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Defines the path to the main
      audit log file.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLog
      /path/to/auditlog</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLog
      /usr/local/apache/logs/audit.log</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This file is open on
      startup when the server typically still runs as<span class="emphasis"><em>
      root</em></span>. You should not allow non-root users to have write
      privileges for this file or for the directory it is stored in..</p><p>This file will be used to store the audit log entries if serial
      audit logging format is used. If concurrent audit logging format is used
      this file will be used as an index, and contain a record of all audit
      log files created. If you are planning to use Concurrent audit logging
      and sending your audit log data off to a remote Console host or
      commercial ModSecurity Management Appliance, then you will need to
      configure and use the ModSecurity Log Collector (mlogc) and use the
      following format for the audit log:</p><p><pre class="programlisting">SecAuditLog "|/path/to/mlogc /path/to/mlogc.conf"</pre></p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10293"></a><code class="literal">SecAuditLog2</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Defines the path to the
      secondary audit log index file when concurrent logging is enabled. See
      <code class="literal">SecAuditLog2</code> for more details.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLog2
      /path/to/auditlog2</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLog2
      /usr/local/apache/logs/audit2.log</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.1.2</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> A main audit log must be
      defined via <code class="literal">SecAuditLog</code> before this
      directive may be used. Additionally, this log is only used for
      replicating the main audit log index file when concurrent audit logging
      is used. It will <span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span> be used for non-concurrent
      audit logging.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N102C5"></a><code class="literal">SecAuditLogDirMode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the mode
      (permissions) of any directories created for concurrent audit logs using
      an octal mode (as used in chmod). See <code class="literal">SecAuditLogFileMode</code> for controlling the mode
      of audit log files.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogDirMode octal_mode|"default"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogDirMode 02750</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.10</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This feature is not
      available on operating systems not supporting octal file modes. The
      default mode (0600) only grants read/write access to the account writing
      the file. If access from another account is needed (using mpm-itk is a
      good example), then this directive may be required. However, use this
      directive with caution to avoid exposing potentially sensitive data to
      unauthorized users. Using the value "default" will revert back to the
      default setting.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>The process umask may still limit the mode if it is being more
        restrictive than the mode set using this directive.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N102F3"></a><code class="literal">SecAuditLogFileMode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the mode
      (permissions) of any files created for concurrent audit logs using an
      octal mode (as used in chmod). See <code class="literal">SecAuditLogDirMode</code> for controlling the mode of
      created audit log directories.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogFileMode
      octal_mode|"default"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogFileMode 00640</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.10</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This feature is not
      available on operating systems not supporting octal file modes. The
      default mode (0600) only grants read/write access to the account writing
      the file. If access from another account is needed (using mpm-itk is a
      good example), then this directive may be required. However, use this
      directive with caution to avoid exposing potentially sensitive data to
      unauthorized users. Using the value "default" will revert back to the
      default setting.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>The process umask may still limit the mode if it is being more
        restrictive than the mode set using this directive.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10321"></a><code class="literal">SecAuditLogParts</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Defines which part of each
      transaction are going to be recorded in audit log. Each part is assigned
      a single letter. If a letter appears in the list then the equivalent
      part of each transactions will be recorded. See below for the list of
      all parts.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogParts PARTS</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogParts ABCFHZ</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> At this time ModSecurity
      does not log response bodies of stock Apache responses (e.g. <code class="literal">404</code>), or the <code class="literal">Server</code> and <code class="literal">Date</code> response headers.</p><p>Default:<code class="literal"> ABCFHZ</code>.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Please refer to the ModSecurity Data Formats document for a
        detailed description of every available part.</p></div><p>Available audit log parts:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">A</code> - audit log header
          (mandatory)</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">B</code> - request headers</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">C</code> - request body (present
          only if the request body exists and ModSecurity is configured to
          intercept it)</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">D</code> - RESERVED for
          intermediary response headers, not implemented yet.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">E</code> - intermediary response
          body (present only if ModSecurity is configured to intercept
          response bodies, and if the audit log engine is configured to record
          it). Intermediary response body is the same as the actual response
          body unless ModSecurity intercepts the intermediary response body,
          in which case the actual response body will contain the error
          message (either the Apache default error message, or the
          ErrorDocument page).</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">F</code> - final response headers
          (excluding the Date and Server headers, which are always added by
          Apache in the late stage of content delivery).</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">G</code> - RESERVED for the actual
          response body, not implemented yet.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">H</code> - audit log
          trailer</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">I</code> - This part is a
          replacement for part C. It will log the same data as C in all cases
          except when <code class="literal">multipart/form-data</code>
          encoding in used. In this case it will log a fake <code class="literal">application/x-www-form-urlencoded</code> body
          that contains the information about parameters but not about the
          files. This is handy if you don't want to have (often large) files
          stored in your audit logs.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">J</code> - RESERVED. This part,
          when implemented, will contain information about the files uploaded
          using <code class="literal">multipart/form-data</code> encoding.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">K</code> - This part contains a
          full list of every rule that matched (one per line) in the order
          they were matched. The rules are fully qualified and will thus show
          inherited actions and default operators. Supported as of
          v2.5.0</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">Z</code> - final boundary,
          signifies the end of the entry (mandatory)</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N103B4"></a><code class="literal">SecAuditLogRelevantStatus</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures which response status
      code is to be considered relevant for the purpose of audit
      logging.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogRelevantStatus REGEX</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogRelevantStatus
      ^(?:5|4\d[^4])</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Must have the
      <code class="literal">SecAuditEngine</code> set to
      <code class="literal">RelevantOnly</code>. The parameter is a regular
      expression.</p><p>The main purpose of this directive is to allow you to configure
      audit logging for only transactions that generate the specified HTTP
      Response Status Code. This directive is often used to the decrease the
      total size of the audit log file. Keep in mind that if this parameter is
      used, then successful attacks that result in a 200 OK status code will
      not be logged.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N103E5"></a><code class="literal">SecAuditLogStorageDir</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the storage directory
      where concurrent audit log entries are to be stored.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogStorageDir
      /path/to/storage/dir</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogStorageDir
      /usr/local/apache/logs/audit</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> SecAuditLogType must be
      set to Concurrent. The directory must already be created before starting
      Apache and it must be writable by the web server user as new files are
      generated at runtime.</p><p>As with all logging mechanisms, ensure that you specify a file
      system location that has adequate disk space and is not on the root
      partition.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1040E"></a><code class="literal">SecAuditLogType</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the type of audit
      logging mechanism to be used.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogType Serial|Concurrent</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecAuditLogType Serial</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Must specify
      <code class="literal">SecAuditLogStorageDir</code> if you use concurrent
      logging.</p><p>Possible values are:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p><code class="literal">Serial</code> - all audit log
          entries will be stored in the main audit logging file. This is more
          convenient for casual use but it is slower as only one audit log
          entry can be written to the file at any one file.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">Concurrent</code> - audit log
          entries will be stored in separate files, one for each transaction.
          Concurrent logging is the mode to use if you are going to send the
          audit log data off to a remote ModSecurity Console host.</p></li></ol></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1044A"></a><code class="literal">SecCacheTransformations</code>
      (Deprecated/Experimental)</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Controls caching of
      transformations. Caching is off by default starting with 2.5.6, when it
      was deprecated and downgraded back to experimental.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecCacheTransformations On|Off
      [options]</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecCacheTransformations On
      "minlen:64,maxlen:0"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> N/A</p><p>First parameter:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">On</code> - cache transformations
          (per transaction, per phase) allowing identical transformations to
          be performed only once. (default)</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">Off</code> - do not cache any
          transformations, forcing all transformations to be performed for
          each rule executed.</p></li></ul></div><p>The following options are allowed (comma separated):</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">incremental:on|off</code> -
          enabling this option will cache every transformation instead of just
          the final transformation. (default: off)</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">maxitems:N</code> - do not allow
          more than N transformations to be cached. The cache will then be
          disabled. A zero value is interpreted as "unlimited". This option
          may be useful to limit caching for a form with a large number of
          ARGS. (default: 512)</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">minlen:N</code> - do not cache the
          transformation if the value's length is less than N bytes. (default:
          32)</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">maxlen:N</code> - do not cache the
          transformation if the value's length is more than N bytes. A zero
          value is interpreted as "unlimited". (default: 1024)</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1049C"></a><code class="literal">SecChrootDir</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the directory path
      that will be used to jail the web server process.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecChrootDir
      /path/to/chroot/dir</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecChrootDir /chroot</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Main</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This feature is not
      available on Windows builds. The internal chroot functionality provided
      by ModSecurity works great for simple setups. One example of a simple
      setup is Apache serving static files only, or running scripts using
      modules.builds. Some problems you might encounter with more complex
      setups:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>DNS lookups do not work (this is because this feature requires
          a shared library that is loaded on demand, after chroot takes
          place).</p></li><li><p>You cannot send email from PHP because it uses sendmail and
          sendmail is outside the jail.</p></li><li><p>In some cases Apache graceful (reload) no longer works.</p></li></ol></div><p>You should be aware that the internal chroot feature might not be
      100% reliable. Due to the large number of default and third-party
      modules available for the Apache web server, it is not possible to
      verify the internal chroot works reliably with all of them. A module,
      working from within Apache, can do things that make it easy to break out
      of the jail. In particular, if you are using any of the modules that
      fork in the module initialisation phase (e.g.
      <code class="literal">mod_fastcgi</code>, <code class="literal">mod_fcgid</code>,
      <code class="literal">mod_cgid</code>), you are advised to examine each Apache
      process and observe its current working directory, process root, and the
      list of open files. Consider what your options are and make your own
      decision.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N104DD"></a><code class="literal">SecComponentSignature</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description</em></span>: Appends component signature to
      the ModSecurity signature.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax</em></span>: <code class="literal">SecComponentSignature
      "COMPONENT_NAME/X.Y.Z (COMMENT)"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example usage</em></span>: <code class="literal">SecComponentSignature
      "Core Rules/1.2.3"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope</em></span>: Main</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version</em></span>: 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes</em></span>: This directive should be
      used to make the presence of significant ModSecurity components known.
      The entire signature will be recorded in transaction audit log. It
      should be used by ModSecurity module and rule set writers to make
      debugging easier.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10504"></a><code class="literal">SecContentInjection</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Enables content injection using
      actions <code class="literal">append</code> and <code class="literal">prepend</code>.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecContentInjection
      (On|Off)</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecContentInjection
      On</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope</em></span>: Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version</em></span>: 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> N/A</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10533"></a><code class="literal">SecCookieFormat</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Selects the cookie format that
      will be used in the current configuration context.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecCookieFormat 0|1</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecCookieFormat 0</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><p>Possible values are:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">0</code> - use version 0
          (Netscape) cookies. This is what most applications use. It is the
          default value.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">1</code> - use version 1
          cookies.</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10569"></a><code class="literal">SecDataDir</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Path where persistent data (e.g.
      IP address data, session data, etc) is to be stored.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecDataDir
      /path/to/dir</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecDataDir /usr/local/apache/logs/data</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Main</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes: </em></span> This directive is needed
      when initcol, setsid an setuid are used. Must be writable by the web
      server user.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1058C"></a><code class="literal">SecDebugLog</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Path to the ModSecurity debug
      log file.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecDebugLog
      /path/to/modsec-debug.log</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecDebugLog
      /usr/local/apache/logs/modsec-debug.log</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N105B3"></a><code class="literal">SecDebugLogLevel</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the verboseness of
      the debug log data.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecDebugLogLevel 0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecDebugLogLevel 4</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Levels <code class="literal">1 - 3</code> are always sent to the Apache error log.
      Therefore you can always use level <code class="literal">0</code>
      as the default logging level in production. Level <code class="literal">5</code> is useful when debugging. It is not
      advisable to use higher logging levels in production as excessive
      logging can slow down server significantly.</p><p>Possible values are:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">0</code> - no logging.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">1</code> - errors (intercepted
          requests) only.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">2</code> - warnings.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">3</code> - notices.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">4</code> - details of how
          transactions are handled.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">5</code> - as above, but including
          information about each piece of information handled.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">9</code> - log everything,
          including very detailed debugging information.</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10613"></a><code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Defines the default action to
      take on a rule match.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecDefaultAction
      action1,action2,action3</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecDefaultAction
      log,auditlog,deny,status:403,phase:2</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Rules following a
      <code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code> directive will inherit this setting
      unless a specific action is specified for an individual rule or until
      another <code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code> is specified. Take special
      note that in the logging disruptive actions are not allowed, but this
      can inadvertently be inherited using a disruptive action in
      <code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code>.</p><p>The default value is minimal (differing from previous
      versions):</p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction phase:2,log,auditlog,pass</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p><code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code> must specify a disruptive
        action and a processing phase and cannot contain metadata
        actions.</p></div><div class="warning" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Warning</h3><p><code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code> is <span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span>
        inherited across configuration contexts. (For an example of why this
        may be a problem for you, read the following ModSecurity Blog entry
        <a href="http://blog.modsecurity.org/2008/07/modsecurity-tri.html" target="_top">http://blog.modsecurity.org/2008/07/modsecurity-tri.html</a>).</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1065E"></a><code class="literal">SecGeoLookupDb</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Defines the path to the
      geographical database file.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecGeoLookupDb /path/to/db</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecGeoLookupDb
      /usr/local/geo/data/GeoLiteCity.dat</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Check out
      <code class="literal">maxmind.com</code> for free database files.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10689"></a><code class="literal">SecGuardianLog</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configuration directive to use
      the httpd-guardian script to monitor for Denial of Service (DoS)
      attacks.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecGuardianLog |/path/to/httpd-guardian</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecGuardianLog
      |/usr/local/apache/bin/httpd-guardian</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Main</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> By default httpd-guardian
      will defend against clients that send more than 120 requests in a
      minute, or more than 360 requests in five minutes.</p><p>Since 1.9, ModSecurity supports a new directive, SecGuardianLog,
      that is designed to send all access data to another program using the
      piped logging feature. Since Apache is typically deployed in a
      multi-process fashion, making information sharing difficult, the idea is
      to deploy a single external process to observe all requests in a
      stateful manner, providing additional protection.</p><p>Development of a state of the art external protection tool will be
      a focus of subsequent ModSecurity releases. However, a fully functional
      tool is already available as part of the <a href="http://www.apachesecurity.net/tools/" target="_top">Apache httpd tools
      project</a>. The tool is called httpd-guardian and can be used to
      defend against Denial of Service attacks. It uses the blacklist tool
      (from the same project) to interact with an iptables-based (Linux) or
      pf-based (*BSD) firewall, dynamically blacklisting the offending IP
      addresses. It can also interact with SnortSam (http://www.snortsam.net).
      Assuming httpd-guardian is already configured (look into the source code
      for the detailed instructions) you only need to add one line to your
      Apache configuration to deploy it:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecGuardianLog |/path/to/httpd-guardian</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N106BC"></a><code class="literal">SecMarker</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Adds a fixed rule marker in the
      ruleset to be used as a target in a <code class="literal">skipAfter</code> action.
      A <code class="literal">SecMarker</code> directive essentially creates a rule that
      does nothing and whose only purpose it to carry the given ID.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecMarker
      ID</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecMarker 9999</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_URI "^/$" \
    "chain,t:none,t:urlDecode,t:lowercase,t:normalisePath,<span class="emphasis"><em>skipAfter:99</em></span>"
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "^127\.0\.0\.1$" "chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent \
    "^Apache \(internal dummy connection\)$" "t:none"  
SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "@eq 0" \
    "deny,log,status:400,id:08,severity:4,msg:'Missing a Host Header'"
SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS:Accept "@eq 0" \
    "log,deny,log,status:400,id:15,msg:'Request Missing an Accept Header'"
<span class="emphasis"><em>
SecMarker 99</em></span></pre></p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N106F4"></a><code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimit</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span>Sets the the match limit in the
      PCRE library. See the pcre_extra field in the pcreapi man page.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimit value</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimit 1500</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Global</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.12</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Default is set at compile
      (1500 by default)</p><p>The <code class="literal">--enable-pcre-match-limit=val</code> configure
      option will set a custom default and the
      <code class="literal">--disable-pcre-match-limit</code> option will resort to the
      compiled PCRE library default.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10725"></a><code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimitRecursion</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span>Sets the the match limit
      recursion in the PCRE library. See the pcre_extra field in the pcreapi
      man page.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimitRecursion value</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimitRecursion 1500</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Global</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.12</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Default is set at compile
      (1500 by default)</p><p>The <code class="literal">--enable-pcre-match-limit-recursion=val</code>
      configure option will set a custom default and the
      <code class="literal">--disable-pcre-match-limit-recursion</code> option will
      resort to the compiled PCRE library default.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10756"></a><code class="literal">SecPdfProtect</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Enables the PDF XSS protection
      functionality. Once enabled access to PDF files is tracked. Direct
      access attempts are redirected to links that contain one-time tokens.
      Requests with valid tokens are allowed through unmodified. Requests with
      invalid tokens are also allowed through but with forced download of the
      PDF files. This implementation uses response headers to detect PDF files
      and thus can be used with dynamically generated PDF files that do not
      have the <code class="filename">.pdf</code> extension in the request URI.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtect On|Off</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtect On</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10781"></a><code class="literal">SecPdfProtectMethod</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configure desired protection
      method to be used when requests for PDF files are detected. Possible
      values are <code class="literal">TokenRedirection</code> and
      <code class="literal">ForcedDownload</code>. The token redirection approach will
      attempt to redirect with tokens where possible. This allows PDF files to
      continue to be opened inline but only works for GET requests. Forced
      download always causes PDF files to be delivered as opaque binaries and
      attachments. The latter will always be used for non-GET requests. Forced
      download is considered to be more secure but may cause usability
      problems for users ("This PDF won't open anymore!").</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtectMethod method</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtectMethod TokenRedirection</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Default:</em></span>
      <code class="literal">TokenRedirection</code></p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N107B7"></a><code class="literal">SecPdfProtectSecret</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Defines the secret that will be
      used to construct one-time tokens. You should use a reasonably long
      value for the secret (e.g. 16 characters is good). Once selected the
      secret should not be changed as it will break the tokens that were sent
      prior to change. But it's not a big deal even if you change it. It will
      just force download of PDF files with tokens that were issued in the
      last few seconds.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtectSecret secret</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtectSecret
      MyRandomSecretString</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N107DE"></a><code class="literal">SecPdfProtectTimeout</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Defines the token timeout. After
      token expires it can no longer be used to allow access to PDF file.
      Request will be allowed through but the PDF will be delivered as
      attachment.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtectTimeout timeout</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtectTimeout 10</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Default:</em></span> <code class="literal">10</code></p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1080C"></a><code class="literal">SecPdfProtectTokenName</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Defines the name of the token.
      The only reason you would want to change the name of the token is if you
      wanted to hide the fact you are running ModSecurity. It's a good reason
      but it won't really help as the adversary can look into the algorithm
      used for PDF protection and figure it out anyway. It does raise the bar
      slightly so go ahead if you want to.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtectTokenName name</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecPdfProtectTokenName PDFTOKEN</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Default:</em></span> <code class="literal">PDFTOKEN</code></p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1083A"></a><code class="literal">SecRequestBodyAccess</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures whether request
      bodies will be buffered and processed by ModSecurity by default.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRequestBodyAccess On|Off</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRequestBodyAccess On</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This directive is
      required if you plan to inspect <code class="literal">POST_PAYLOAD</code>. This
      directive must be used along with the "phase:2" processing phase action
      and <code class="literal">REQUEST_BODY</code> variable/location. If any of these 3
      parts are not configured, you will not be able to inspect the request
      bodies.</p><p>Possible values are:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">On</code> - access request
          bodies.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">Off</code> - do not attempt to
          access request bodies.</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10878"></a><code class="literal">SecRequestBodyLimit</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the maximum request
      body size ModSecurity will accept for buffering.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRequestBodyLimit NUMBER_IN_BYTES</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRequestBodyLimit 134217728</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> 131072 KB (134217728
      bytes) is the default setting. Anything over this limit will be rejected
      with status code 413 Request Entity Too Large. There is a hard limit of
      1 GB.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1089B"></a><code class="literal">SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the maximum request
      body size ModSecurity will accept for buffering, excluding the size of
      files being transported in the request. This directive comes handy to
      further reduce susceptibility to DoS attacks when someone is sending
      request bodies of very large sizes. Web applications that require file
      uploads must configure <code class="literal">SecRequestBodyLimit</code> to a high
      value. Since large files are streamed to disk file uploads will not
      increase memory consumption. However, it's still possible for someone to
      take advantage of a large request body limit and send non-upload
      requests with large body sizes. This directive eliminates that
      loophole.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit
      NUMBER_IN_BYTES</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRequestBodyLimit 131072</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> 1 MB (1048576 bytes) is
      the default setting. This value is very conservative. For most
      applications you should be able to reduce it down to 128 KB or lower.
      Anything over the limit will be rejected with status code <code class="literal">413
      Request Entity Too Large</code>. There is a hard limit of 1
      GB.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N108C6"></a><code class="literal">SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the maximum request
      body size ModSecurity will store in memory.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit
      NUMBER_IN_BYTES</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit 131072</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><p>By default the limit is 128 KB:</p><pre class="programlisting"># Store up to 128 KB in memory
SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit 131072</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N108F2"></a><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyLimit</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the maximum response
      body size that will be accepted for buffering.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyLimit NUMBER_IN_BYTES</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyLimit 524228</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Anything over this limit
      will be rejected with status code 500 Internal Server Error. This
      setting will not affect the responses with MIME types that are not
      marked for buffering. There is a hard limit of 1 GB.</p><p>By default this limit is configured to 512 KB:</p><pre class="programlisting"># Buffer response bodies of up to 512 KB in length 
SecResponseBodyLimit 524288</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1091E"></a><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyLimitAction</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description</em></span>: Controls what happens once a
      response body limit, configured with
      <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyLimit</code>, is encountered. By default
      ModSecurity will reject a response body that is longer than specified.
      Some web sites, however, will produce very long responses making it
      difficult to come up with a reasonable limit. Such sites would have to
      raise the limit significantly to function properly defying the purpose
      of having the limit in the first place (to control memory consumption).
      With the ability to choose what happens once a limit is reached site
      administrators can choose to inspect only the first part of the
      response, the part that can fit into the desired limit, and let the rest
      through. Some could argue that allowing parts of responses to go
      uninspected is a weakness. This is true in theory but only applies to
      cases where the attacker controls the output (e.g. can make it arbitrary
      long). In such cases, however, it is not possible to prevent leakage
      anyway. The attacker could compress, obfuscate, or even encrypt data
      before it is sent back, and therefore bypass any monitoring
      device.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax</em></span>: <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyLimitAction
      Reject|ProcessPartial</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage</em></span>:
      <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase</em></span>: N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope</em></span>: Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10949"></a><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyMimeType</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures which<code class="literal"> MIME</code> types are to be considered for response
      body buffering.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyMimeType mime/type</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain
      text/html</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Multiple<code class="literal"> SecResponseBodyMimeType</code> directives can be
      used to add<code class="literal"> MIME</code> types.</p><p>The default value is <code class="literal">text/plaintext/html</code>:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain text/html</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10985"></a><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyMimeTypesClear</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Clears the list of <code class="literal">MIME</code> types considered for response body
      buffering, allowing you to start populating the list from
      scratch.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyMimeTypesClear</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyMimeTypesClear</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N109B0"></a><code class="literal">SecResponseBodyAccess</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures whether response
      bodies are to be buffer and analysed or not.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyAccess On|Off</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecResponseBodyAccess On</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This directive is
      required if you plan to inspect HTML responses. This directive must be
      used along with the "phase:4" processing phase action and RESPONSE_BODY
      variable/location. If any of these 3 parts are not configured, you will
      not be able to inspect the response bodies.</p><p>Possible values are:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">On</code> - access response bodies
          (but only if the MIME type matches, see above).</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">Off</code> - do not attempt to
          access response bodies.</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N109E6"></a><code class="literal">SecRule</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRule</code> is the main ModSecurity directive. It
      is used to analyse data and perform actions based on the results.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRule
      VARIABLES OPERATOR [ACTIONS]</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRule REQUEST_URI "attack" \</code></p><p><code class="literal">
      "phase:1,t:none,t:urlDecode,t:lowercase,t:normalisePath"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><p>In general, the format of this rule is as follows:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule VARIABLES OPERATOR [ACTIONS]</pre><p>The second part, <code class="literal">OPERATOR</code>,
      specifies how they are going to be checked. The third (optional) part,
      <code class="literal">ACTIONS</code>, specifies what to do
      whenever the operator used performs a successful match against a
      variable.</p><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="N10A24"></a>Variables in rules</h4></div></div><div></div></div><p>The first part,<code class="literal"> VARIABLES</code>,
        specifies which variables are to be checked. For example, the
        following rule will reject a transaction that has the word<span class="emphasis"><em>
        dirty</em></span> in the URI:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS dirty</pre><p>Each rule can specify one or more variables:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent dirty</pre><p>There is a third format supported by the selection operator -
        XPath expression. XPath expressions can only used against the special
        variable XML, which is available only of the request body was
        processed as XML.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule XML:/xPath/Expression dirty</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Not all collections support all selection operator format
          types. You should refer to the documentation of each collection to
          determine what is and isn't supported.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="N10A40"></a>Collections</h4></div></div><div></div></div><p>A variable can contain one or many pieces of data, depending on
        the nature of the variable and the way it is used. We've seen examples
        of both approaches in the previous section. When a variable can
        contain more than one value we refer to it as a
        <span class="emphasis"><em>collection</em></span>.</p><p>Collections are always expanded before a rule is run. For
        example, the following rule:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS dirty</pre><p>will be expanded to:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS:p dirty
SecRule ARGS:q dirty</pre><p>in a requests that has only two parameters, named
        <code class="literal">p</code> and <code class="literal">q</code>.</p><p>Collections come in several flavours:</p><div class="variablelist"><dl><dt><span class="term">Read-only</span></dt><dd><p>Created at runtime using transaction data. For example:
              <code class="literal">ARGS</code> (contains a list of all request
              parameter values) and <code class="literal">REQUEST_HEADERS</code>
              (contains a list of all request header values).</p></dd><dt><span class="term">Transient Read/Write</span></dt><dd><p>The <code class="literal">TX</code> collection is created (empty)
              for every transaction. Rules can read from it and write to it
              (using the <code class="literal">setvar</code> action, for example), but
              the information stored in this collection will not survive the
              end of transaction.</p></dd><dt><span class="term">Persistent Read/Write</span></dt><dd><p>There are several collections that can be written to, but
              which are persisted to the storage backend. These collections
              are used to track clients across transactions. Examples of
              collections that fall into this type are <code class="literal">IP</code>,
              <code class="literal">SESSION</code> and <code class="literal">USER</code>.</p></dd></dl></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="N10A8D"></a>Operators in rules</h4></div></div><div></div></div><p>In the simplest possible case you will use a regular expression
        pattern as the second rule parameter. This is what we've done in the
        examples above. If you do this ModSecurity assumes you want to use the
        <code class="literal">rx</code> (regular expression) operator.
        You can also explicitly specify the operator you want to use by using
        <code class="literal">@</code>, followed by the name of an
        operator, at the beginning of the second <code class="literal">SecRule</code>
        parameter:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS "@rx dirty"</pre><p>Note how we had to use double quotes to delimit the second rule
        parameter. This is because the second parameter now has whitespace in
        it. Any number of whitespace characters can follow the name of the
        operator. If there are any non-whitespace characters there, they will
        all be treated as a special parameter to the operator. In the case of
        the regular expression operator the special parameter is the pattern
        that will be used for comparison.</p><p>The @ can be the second character if you are using negation to
        negate the result returned by the operator:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;ARGS "!@rx ^0$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="N10AA8"></a>Operator negation</h4></div></div><div></div></div><p>Operator results can be negated by using an exclamation mark at
        the beginning of the second parameter. The following rule matches if
        the word <code class="literal">dirty</code> does <span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span> appear
        in the <code class="literal">User-Agent</code> request header:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent !dirty</pre><p>You can use the exclamation mark in combination with any
        parameter. If you do, the exclamation mark needs to go first, followed
        by the explicit operator reference. The following rule has the same
        effect as the previous example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "!@rx dirty"</pre><p>If you need to use negation in a rule that is going to be
        applied to several variables then it may not be immediately clear what
        will happen. Consider the following example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS:p|ARGS:q !dirty</pre><p>The above rule is identical to:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS:p !dirty
SecRule ARGS:q !dirty</pre><div class="warning" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Warning</h3><p>Negation is applied to operations against individual
          operations, not agains the entire variable list.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="N10ACD"></a>Actions in rules</h4></div></div><div></div></div><p>The third parameter, <code class="literal">ACTIONS</code>,
        can be omitted only because there is a helper feature that specifies
        the default action list. If the parameter isn't omitted the actions
        specified in the parameter will be merged with the default action list
        to create the actual list of actions that will be processed on a rule
        match.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10AD6"></a><code class="literal">SecRuleInheritance</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures whether the current
      context will inherit rules from the parent context (configuration
      options are inherited in most cases - you should look up the
      documentation for every directive to determine if it is inherited or
      not).</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleInheritance On|Off</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleInheritance Off</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Resource-specific
      contexts (e.g.<code class="literal"> Location</code>, <code class="literal">Directory</code>, etc) cannot override
      <span class="emphasis"><em>phase1</em></span> rules configured in the main server or in
      the virtual server. This is because phase 1 is run early in the request
      processing process, before Apache maps request to resource. Virtual host
      context can override phase 1 rules configured in the main server.</p><p>Example: The following example shows where ModSecurity may be
      enabled in the main Apache configuration scope, however you might want
      to configure your VirtualHosts differently. In the first example, the
      first VirtualHost is not inheriting the ModSecurity main config
      directives and in the second one it is.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRuleEngine On
SecDefaultAction log,pass,phase:2
...  

&lt;VirtualHost *:80&gt;
ServerName app1.com 
ServerAlias www.app1.com<span class="emphasis"><em>
SecRuleInheritance Off</em></span>
SecDefaultAction log,deny,phase:1,redirect:http://www.site2.com 
... 
&lt;/VirtualHost&gt;  

&lt;VirtualHost *:80&gt; 
ServerName app2.com 
ServerAlias www.app2.com
<span class="emphasis"><em>SecRuleInheritance On</em></span> SecRule ARGS "attack" 
... 
&lt;/VirtualHost&gt;</pre><p>Possible values are:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">On</code> - inherit rules from the
          parent context.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">Off</code> - do not inherit rules
          from the parent context.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Configuration contexts are an Apache concept. Directives
            <code class="literal">&lt;Directory&gt;</code>,
            <code class="literal">&lt;Files&gt;</code>,
            <code class="literal">&lt;Location&gt;</code> and
            <code class="literal">&lt;VirtualHost&gt;</code> are all used to create
            configuration contexts. For more information please go to the
            Apache documentation section <a href="http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.0/sections.html" target="_top">Configuration
            Sections</a>.</p></div></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10B39"></a><code class="literal">SecRuleEngine</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the rules
      engine.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleEngine On|Off|DetectionOnly</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleEngine On</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This directive can also
      be controlled by the ctl action (ctl:ruleEngine=off) for per rule
      processing.</p><p>Possible values are:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">On</code> - process rules.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">Off</code> - do not process
          rules.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">DetectionOnly</code> - process
          rules but never intercept transactions, even when rules are
          configured to do so.</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10B75"></a><code class="literal">SecRuleRemoveById</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Removes matching rules from the
      parent contexts.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleUpdateActionById RULEID
      ACTIONLIST</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleRemoveByID 1 2 "9000-9010"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This directive supports
      multiple parameters, where each parameter can either be a rule ID, or a
      range. Parameters that contain spaces must be delimited using double
      quotes.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRuleRemoveById 1 2 5 10-20 "400-556" 673</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10B9F"></a><code class="literal">SecRuleRemoveByMsg</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Removes matching rules from the
      parent contexts.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleRemoveByMsg REGEX</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleRemoveByMsg "FAIL"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This directive supports
      multiple parameters. Each parameter is a regular expression that will be
      applied to the message (specified using the <code class="literal">msg</code> action).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10BCA"></a><code class="literal">SecRuleScript</code> (Experimental)</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This directive creates a special
      rule that executes a Lua script to decide whether to match or not. The
      main difference from <code class="literal">SecRule</code> is that there are no
      targets nor operators. The script can fetch any variable from the
      ModSecurity context and use any (Lua) operator to test them. The second
      optional parameter is the list of actions whose meaning is identical to
      that of <code class="literal">SecRule</code>.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleScript
      /path/to/script.lua [ACTIONS]</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleScript "/path/to/file.lua"
      "block"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> None</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>All Lua scripts are compiled at configuration time and cached in
        memory. To reload scripts you must reload the entire ModSecurity
        configuration by restarting Apache.</p></div><p>Example script:</p><pre class="programlisting">-- Your script must define the <span class="emphasis"><em>main</em></span> entry
-- point, as below.
function main()
    -- Log something at level 1. Normally you shouldn't be
    -- logging anything, especially not at level 1, but this is
    -- just to show you can. Useful for debugging.
    m.log(1, "Hello world!");

    -- Retrieve one variable.
    local var1 = m.getvar("REMOTE_ADDR");

    -- Retrieve one variable, applying one transformation function.
    -- The second parameter is a string.
    local var2 = m.getvar("ARGS", "lowercase");

    -- Retrieve one variable, applying several transformation functions.
    -- The second parameter is now a list. You should note that m.getvar()
    -- requires the use of comma to separate collection names from
    -- variable names. This is because only one variable is returned.
    local var3 = m.getvar("ARGS.p", { "lowercase", "compressWhitespace" } );

    -- If you want this rule to match return a string
    -- containing the error message. The message <span class="emphasis"><em>must</em></span> contain the name
    -- of the variable where the problem is located.
    -- return "Variable ARGS:p looks suspicious!"

    -- Otherwise, simply return nil.
    return nil;
end</pre><p>In this first example we were only retrieving one variable at the
      time. In this case the name of the variable is known to you. In many
      cases, however, you will want to examine variables whose names you won't
      know in advance, for example script parameters.</p><p>Example showing use of <code class="literal">m.getvars()</code> to retrieve
      many variables at once:</p><pre class="programlisting">function main()
    -- Retrieve script parameters.
    local d = m.getvars("ARGS", { "lowercase", "htmlEntityDecode" } );

    -- Loop through the paramters.
    for i = 1, #d do
        -- Examine parameter value.
        if (string.find(d[i].value, "&lt;script")) then
            -- Always specify the name of the variable where the
            -- problem is located in the error message.
            return ("Suspected XSS in variable " .. d[i].name .. ".");
        end
    end

    -- Nothing wrong found.
    return nil;
end</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Go to <a href="http://www.lua.org/" target="_top">http://www.lua.org/</a> to find more
        about the Lua programming language. The reference manual too is
        available online, at <a href="http://www.lua.org/manual/5.1/" target="_top">http://www.lua.org/manual/5.1/</a>.</p></div><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Lua support is marked as <span class="emphasis"><em>experimental</em></span> as
        the way the progamming interface may continue to evolve while we are
        working for the best implementation style. Any user input into the
        programming interface is appreciated.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10C24"></a><code class="literal">SecRuleUpdateActionById</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Updates the action list of the
      specified rule.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleRemoveById RULEID ACTIONLIST</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecRuleUpdateActionById 12345
      deny,status:403</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This directive merges the
      specified action list with the rule's action list. There are two
      limitations. The rule ID cannot be changed, nor can the phase. Further
      note that actions that may be specified multiple times are appended to
      the original.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction \
  "t:lowercase,phase:2,id:12345,pass,msg:'The Message',log,auditlog"
SecRuleUpdateActionById 12345 "t:compressWhitespace,deny,status:403,msg:'A new message'</pre><p>The example above will cause the rule to be executed as if it was
      specified as follows:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction \
  "t:lowercase,phase:2,id:12345,log,auditlog,t:compressWhitespace,deny,status:403,msg:'A new message'"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10C53"></a><code class="literal">SecServerSignature</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Instructs ModSecurity to change
      the data presented in the "Server:" response header token.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecServerSignature "WEB SERVER
      SOFTWARE"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecServerSignature
      "Netscape-Enterprise/6.0"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Main</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> In order for this
      directive to work, you must set the Apache ServerTokens directive to
      Full. ModSecurity will overwrite the server signature data held in this
      memory space with the data set in this directive. If ServerTokens is not
      set to Full, then the memory space is most likely not large enough to
      hold the new data we are looking to insert.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10C7A"></a><code class="literal">SecTmpDir</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the directory where
      temporary files will be created.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecTmpDir
      /path/to/dir</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecTmpDir /tmp</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Needs to be writable by
      the Apache user process. This is the directory location where Apache
      will swap data to disk if it runs out of memory (more data than what was
      specified in the SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit directive) during
      inspection.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10CA1"></a><code class="literal">SecUploadDir</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the directory where
      intercepted files will be stored.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecUploadDir
      /path/to/dir</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecUploadDir /tmp</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This directory must be on
      the same filesystem as the temporary directory defined with <code class="literal">SecTmpDir</code>. This directive is used with
      <code class="literal">SecUploadKeepFiles</code>.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10CD0"></a><code class="literal">SecUploadFileLimit</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the maximum number of
      file uploads processed in a multipart POST.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecUploadFileLimit number</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecUploadFileLimit 10</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.5.12</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> The default is set to 100
      files, but you are encouraged to reduce this value. Any file over the
      limit will not be extracted and the <code class="literal">MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED</code> and <code class="literal">MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR</code> flags will be set. To
      prevent bypassing any file checks, you must check for one of these
      flags.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>If the limit is exceeded, the part name and file name will still
        be recorded in <code class="literal">FILES_NAME</code> and
        <code class="literal">FILES</code>, the file size will be
        recorded in <code class="literal">FILES_SIZES</code>, but there
        will be no record in <code class="literal">FILES_TMPNAMES</code>
        as a temporary file was not created.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10D12"></a><code class="literal">SecUploadFileMode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures the mode
      (permissions) of any uploaded files using an octal mode (as used in
      chmod).</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecUploadFileMode octal_mode|"default"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecUploadFileMode 0640</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.1.6</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This feature is not
      available on operating systems not supporting octal file modes. The
      default mode (0600) only grants read/write access to the account writing
      the file. If access from another account is needed (using clamd is a
      good example), then this directive may be required. However, use this
      directive with caution to avoid exposing potentially sensitive data to
      unauthorized users. Using the value "default" will revert back to the
      default setting.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>The process umask may still limit the mode if it is being more
        restrictive than the mode set using this directive.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10D3C"></a><code class="literal">SecUploadKeepFiles</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures whether or not the
      intercepted files will be kept after transaction is processed.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecUploadKeepFiles On|Off|RelevantOnly</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecUploadKeepFiles On</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> This directive requires
      the storage directory to be defined (using <code class="literal">SecUploadDir</code>).</p><p>Possible values are:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">On</code> - Keep uploaded
          files.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">Off</code> - Do not keep uploaded
          files.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">RelevantOnly</code> - This will
          keep only those files that belong to requests that are deemed
          relevant.</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10D7C"></a><code class="literal">SecWebAppId</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Creates a partition on the
      server that belongs to one web application.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Syntax:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecWebAppId
      "NAME"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Example Usage:</em></span> <code class="literal">SecWebAppId "WebApp1"</code></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phase:</em></span> N/A</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Any</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Version:</em></span> 2.0.0</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Dependencies/Notes:</em></span> Partitions are used to
      avoid collisions between session IDs and user IDs. This directive must
      be used if there are multiple applications deployed on the same server.
      If it isn't used, a collision between session IDs might occur. The
      default value is<code class="literal"> default</code>.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">&lt;VirtualHost *:80&gt; 
ServerName app1.com 
ServerAlias www.app1.com
<span class="emphasis"><em>SecWebAppId "App1"</em></span>
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:PHPSESSID !^$ chain,nolog,pass 
SecAction setsid:%{REQUEST_COOKIES.PHPSESSID} 
... 
&lt;/VirtualHost&gt;  

&lt;VirtualHost *:80&gt; 
ServerName app2.com 
ServerAlias www.app2.com<span class="emphasis"><em>
SecWebAppId "App2"</em></span>
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:PHPSESSID !^$ chain,nolog,pass 
SecAction setsid:%{REQUEST_COOKIES.PHPSESSID} 
... 
&lt;/VirtualHost&gt;</pre><p>In the two examples configurations shown, SecWebAppId is being
      used in conjunction with the Apache VirtualHost directives. What this
      achieves is to create more unique collection names when being hosted on
      one server. Normally, when setsid is used, ModSecurity will create a
      collection with the name "SESSION" and it will hold the value specified.
      With using SecWebAppId as shown in the examples, however, the name of
      the collection would become "App1_SESSION" and "App2_SESSION".</p><p>SecWebAppId is relevant in two cases:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>You are logging transactions/alerts to the ModSecurity Console
          and you want to use the web application ID to search only the
          transactions belonging to that application.</p></li><li><p>You are using the data persistence facility (collections
          SESSION and USER) and you need to avoid collisions between sessions
          and users belonging to different applications.</p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="processing-phases"></a>Processing Phases</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>ModSecurity 2.x allows rules to be placed in one of the following
    five phases:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>Request headers (<code class="literal">REQUEST_HEADERS</code>)</p></li><li><p>Request body (<code class="literal">REQUEST_BODY</code>)</p></li><li><p>Response headers (<code class="literal">RESPONSE_HEADERS</code>)</p></li><li><p>Response body (<code class="literal">RESPONSE_BODY</code>)</p></li><li><p>Logging (<code class="literal">LOGGING</code>)</p></li></ol></div><p>Below is a diagram of the standard Apache Request Cycle. In the
    diagram, the 5 ModSecurity processing phases are shown.</p><p><div><img src="apache_request_cycle-modsecurity.jpg" width="495"></div></p><p>In order to select the phase a rule executes during, use the phase
    action either directly in the rule or in using the
    <code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code> directive:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction "log,pass,<span class="emphasis"><em>phase:2</em></span>"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "!^$" "deny,<span class="emphasis"><em>phase:1</em></span>"</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Keep in mind that rules are executed according to phases, so even
      if two rules are adjacent in a configuration file, but are set to
      execute in different phases, they would not happen one after the other.
      The order of rules in the configuration file is important only within
      the rules of each phase. This is especially important when using the
      <code class="literal">skip</code> and <code class="literal">skipAfter</code> actions.</p></div><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>The <code class="literal">LOGGING</code> phase is special. It is executed at
      the end of each transaction no matter what happened in the previous
      phases. This means it will be processed even if the request was
      intercepted or the <code class="literal">allow</code> action was used to pass the
      transaction through.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10E17"></a>Phase Request Headers</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Rules in this phase are processed immediately after Apache
      completes reading the request headers (post-read-request phase). At this
      point the request body has not been read yet, meaning not all request
      arguments are available. Rules should be placed in this phase if you
      need to have them run early (before Apache does something with the
      request), to do something before the request body has been read,
      determine whether or not the request body should be buffered, or decide
      how you want the request body to be processed (e.g. whether to parse it
      as XML or not).</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Rules in this phase can not leverage Apache scope directives
      (Directory, Location, LocationMatch, etc...) as the post-read-request
      hook does not have this information yet. The exception here is the
      VirtualHost directive. If you want to use ModSecurity rules inside
      Apache locations, then they should run in Phase 2. Refer to the Apache
      Request Cycle/ModSecurity Processing Phases diagram.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10E21"></a>Phase Request Body</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This is the general-purpose input analysis phase. Most of the
      application-oriented rules should go here. In this phase you are
      guaranteed to have received the request arguments (provided the request
      body has been read). ModSecurity supports three encoding types for the
      request body phase:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">application/x-www-form-urlencoded</code> - used to
          transfer form data</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">multipart/form-data</code> - used for file
          transfers</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">text/xml</code> - used for passing XML data</p></li></ul></div><p>Other encodings are not used by most web applications.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10E3B"></a>Phase Response Headers</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This phase takes place just before response headers are sent back
      to the client. Run here if you want to observe the response before that
      happens, and if you want to use the response headers to determine if you
      want to buffer the response body. Note that some response status codes
      (such as 404) are handled earlier in the request cycle by Apache and my
      not be able to be triggered as expected. Additionally, there are some
      response headers that are added by Apache at a later hook (such as Date,
      Server and Connection) that we would not be able to trigger on or
      sanitize. This should work appropriately in a proxy setup or within
      phase:5 (logging).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10E40"></a>Phase Response Body</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This is the general-purpose output analysis phase. At this point
      you can run rules against the response body (provided it was buffered,
      of course). This is the phase where you would want to inspect the
      outbound HTML for information disclosure, error messages or failed
      authentication text.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10E45"></a>Phase Logging</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This phase is run just before logging takes place. The rules
      placed into this phase can only affect how the logging is performed.
      This phase can be used to inspect the error messages logged by Apache.
      You cannot deny/block connections in this phase as it is too late. This
      phase also allows for inspection of other response headers that weren't
      available during phase:3 or phase:4. Note that you must be careful not
      to inherit a disruptive action into a rule in this phase as this is a
      configuration error in ModSecurity 2.5.0 and later versions.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="variables"></a>Variables</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>The following variables are supported in ModSecurity 2.x:</p><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10E50"></a><code class="literal">ARGS</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><code class="literal">ARGS</code> is a collection and can be used on its own
      (means all arguments including the POST Payload), with a static
      parameter (matches arguments with that name), or with a regular
      expression (matches all arguments with name that matches the regular
      expression). To look at only the query string or body arguments, see the
      <code class="literal">ARGS_GET</code> and <code class="literal">ARGS_POST</code>
      collections.</p><p>Some variables are actually collections, which are expanded into
      more variables at runtime. The following example will examine all
      request arguments:<pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS dirty</pre>
      Sometimes, however, you will want to look only at parts of a collection.
      This can be achieved with the help of the <span class="emphasis"><em>selection
      operator</em></span>(colon). The following example will only look at the
      arguments named<code class="literal"> p</code> (do note that, in
      general, requests can contain multiple arguments with the same name):
      <pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS:p dirty</pre>
      It is also possible to specify exclusions. The following will examine
      all request arguments for the word<span class="emphasis"><em> dirty</em></span>, except
      the ones named <code class="literal">z</code> (again, there can be
      zero or more arguments named<code class="literal"> z</code>):
      <pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS|!ARGS:z dirty</pre>
      There is a special operator that allows you to count how many variables
      there are in a collection. The following rule will trigger if there is
      more than zero arguments in the request (ignore the second parameter for
      the time being): <pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;ARGS !^0$</pre>
      And sometimes you need to look at an array of parameters, each with a
      slightly different name. In this case you can specify a regular
      expression in the selection operator itself. The following rule will
      look into all arguments whose names begin with <code class="literal">id_</code>: <pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS:/^id_/ dirty</pre></p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Using <code class="literal">ARGS:p</code> will not result in any
        invocations against the operator if argument p does not exist.</p><p>In ModSecurity 1.X, the <code class="literal">ARGS</code> variable stood
        for <code class="literal">QUERY_STRING</code> + <code class="literal">POST_PAYLOAD</code>,
        whereas now it expands to individual variables.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10EA2"></a><code class="literal">ARGS_COMBINED_SIZE</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable allows you to set more targeted evaluations on the
      total size of the Arguments as compared with normal Apache LimitRequest
      directives. For example, you could create a rule to ensure that the
      total size of the argument data is below a certain threshold (to help
      prevent buffer overflow issues). Example: Block request if the size of
      the arguments is above 25 characters.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "^/cgi-bin/login\.php" \
    "chain,log,deny,phase:2,t:none,t:lowercase,t:normalisePath"
SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>ARGS_COMBINED_SIZE</em></span> "@gt 25"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10EAF"></a><code class="literal">ARGS_NAMES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Is a collection of the argument names. You can search for specific
      argument names that you want to block. In a positive policy scenario,
      you can also whitelist (using an inverted rule with the ! character)
      only authorized argument names. Example: This example rule will only
      allow 2 argument names - p and a. If any other argument names are
      injected, it will be blocked.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "/index.php" \
    "chain,log,deny,status:403,phase:2,t:none,t:lowercase,t:normalisePath"
SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> ARGS_NAMES</em></span> "!^(p|a)$" "t:none,t:lowercase"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10EBC"></a><code class="literal">ARGS_GET</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><code class="literal">ARGS_GET</code> is similar to <code class="literal">ARGS</code>,
      but only contains arguments from the query string.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10ECA"></a><code class="literal">ARGS_GET_NAMES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><code class="literal">ARGS_GET_NAMES</code> is similar to
      <code class="literal">ARGS_NAMES</code>, but only contains argument names from the
      query string.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10ED8"></a><code class="literal">ARGS_POST</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><code class="literal">ARGS_POST</code> is similar to
      <code class="literal">ARGS</code>, but only contains arguments from the POST
      body.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10EE6"></a><code class="literal">ARGS_POST_NAMES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><code class="literal">ARGS_POST_NAMES</code> is similar to
      <code class="literal">ARGS_NAMES</code>, but only contains argument names from the
      POST body.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10EF4"></a><code class="literal">AUTH_TYPE</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the authentication method used to validate a
      user. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>AUTH_TYPE</em></span> "basic" log,deny,status:403,phase:1,t:lowercase</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This data will not be available in a proxy-mode deployment as the
      authentication is not local. In a proxy-mode deployment, you would need
      to inspect the <code class="literal">REQUEST_HEADERS:Authorization</code>
      header.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10F0A"></a><code class="literal">ENV</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Collection, requires a single parameter (after colon). The
      <code class="literal">ENV</code> variable is set with setenv and does not give
      access to the CGI environment variables. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "printenv" pass,<span class="emphasis"><em>setenv:tag=suspicious</em></span>
SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>ENV:tag</em></span> "suspicious"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10F1E"></a><code class="literal">FILES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Collection. Contains a collection of original file names (as they
      were called on the remote user's file system). Note: only available if
      files were extracted from the request body. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> FILES</em></span> "\.conf$" log,deny,status:403,phase:2</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10F2B"></a><code class="literal">FILES_COMBINED_SIZE</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Single value. Total size of the uploaded files. Note: only
      available if files were extracted from the request body. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>FILES_COMBINED_SIZE</em></span> "@gt 1000" log,deny,status:403,phase:2</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10F38"></a><code class="literal">FILES_NAMES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Collection w/o parameter. Contains a list of form fields that were
      used for file upload. Note: only available if files were extracted from
      the request body. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> FILES_NAMES</em></span> "^upfile$" log,deny,status:403,phase:2</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10F45"></a><code class="literal">FILES_SIZES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Collection. Contains a list of file sizes. Useful for implementing
      a size limitation on individual uploaded files. Note: only available if
      files were extracted from the request body. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>FILES_SIZES</em></span> "@gt 100" log,deny,status:403,phase:2</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10F52"></a><code class="literal">FILES_TMPNAMES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Collection. Contains a collection of temporary files' names on the
      disk. Useful when used together with <code class="literal">@inspectFile.</code> Note: only available if files
      were extracted from the request body. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>FILES_TMPNAMES</em></span> "@inspectFile /path/to/inspect_script.pl"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10F63"></a><code class="literal">GEO</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><code class="literal">GEO</code> is a collection populated by the results of
      the last <code class="literal">@geoLookup</code> operator. The
      collection can be used to match geographical fields looked from an IP
      address or hostname.</p><p>Available since ModSecurity 2.5.0.</p><p>Fields:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>COUNTRY_CODE:</em></span> Two character country code.
          EX: US, GB, etc.</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>COUNTRY_CODE3:</em></span> Up to three character
          country code.</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>COUNTRY_NAME:</em></span> The full country
          name.</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>COUNTRY_CONTINENT:</em></span> The two character
          continent that the country is located. EX: EU</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>REGION:</em></span> The two character region. For US,
          this is state. For Canada, providence, etc.</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>CITY:</em></span> The city name if supported by the
          database.</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>POSTAL_CODE:</em></span> The postal code if supported
          by the database.</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>LATITUDE:</em></span> The latitude if supported by
          the database.</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>LONGITUDE:</em></span> The longitude if supported by
          the database.</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>DMA_CODE:</em></span> The metropolitan area code if
          supported by the database. (US only)</p></li><li><p><span class="emphasis"><em>AREA_CODE:</em></span> The phone system area code.
          (US only)</p></li></ul></div><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecGeoLookupDb /usr/local/geo/data/GeoLiteCity.dat
...
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "<span class="emphasis"><em>@geoLookup</em></span>" "chain,drop,msg:'Non-GB IP address'"
SecRule GEO:COUNTRY_CODE "!@streq GB"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10FB5"></a><code class="literal">HIGHEST_SEVERITY</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the highest severity of any rules that have
      matched so far. Severities are numeric values and thus can be used with
      comparison operators such as <code class="literal">@lt</code>,
      etc.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Higher severities have a lower numeric value.</p><p>A value of 255 indicates no severity has been set.</p></div><pre class="programlisting">SecRule HIGHEST_SEVERITY "@le 2" "phase:2,deny,status:500,msg:'severity %{HIGHEST_SEVERITY}'"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10FC8"></a><code class="literal">MATCHED_VAR</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the value of the variable that was matched
      against. It is similar to the TX:0, except it can be used for all
      operators and does not require that the <code class="literal">capture</code> action be specified.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS pattern chain,deny
...
SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>MATCHED_VAR</em></span> "further scrutiny"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10FD9"></a><code class="literal">MATCHED_VAR_NAME</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the full name of the variable that was matched
      against.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS pattern setvar:tx.mymatch=%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}
...
SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>TX:MYMATCH</em></span> "@eq ARGS:param" deny</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10FE6"></a><code class="literal">MODSEC_BUILD</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the ModSecurity build number. This variable is
      intended to be used to check the build number prior to using a feature
      that is available only in a certain build. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>MODSEC_BUILD</em></span> "!@ge 02050102" skipAfter:12345
SecRule ARGS "@pm some key words" id:12345,deny,status:500</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N10FF3"></a><code class="literal">MULTIPART_CRLF_LF_LINES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This flag variable will be set to <code class="literal">1</code> whenever a
      multi-part request uses mixed line terminators. The
      <code class="literal">multipart/form-data</code> RFC requires
      <code class="literal">CRLF</code> sequence to be used to terminate lines. Since
      some client implementations use only <code class="literal">LF</code> to terminate
      lines you might want to allow them to proceed under certain
      circumstances (if you want to do this you will need to stop using
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR</code> and check each multi-part flag
      variable individually, avoiding <code class="literal">MULTIPART_LF_LINE</code>).
      However, mixing <code class="literal">CRLF</code> and <code class="literal">LF</code> line
      terminators is dangerous as it can allow for evasion. Therefore, in such
      cases, you will have to add a check for
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_CRLF_LF_LINES</code>.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1101E"></a><code class="literal">MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><code class="literal">MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR</code> will be set to
      <code class="literal">1</code> when any of the following variables is also set to
      <code class="literal">1</code>: <code class="literal">REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR</code>,
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED</code>,
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE</code>,
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE</code>,
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER</code>,
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING</code>,
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_LF_LINE</code>,
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_SEMICOLON_MISSING</code>
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING</code>
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_INVALID_HEADER_FOLDING</code>
      <code class="literal">MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED</code>. Each of these
      variables covers one unusual (although sometimes legal) aspect of the
      request body in <code class="literal">multipart/form-data format</code>. Your
      policies should <span class="emphasis"><em>always</em></span> contain a rule to check
      either this variable (easier) or one or more individual variables (if
      you know exactly what you want to accomplish). Depending on the rate of
      false positives and your default policy you should decide whether to
      block or just warn when the rule is triggered.</p><p>The best way to use this variable is as in the example
      below:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Multipart request body \
failed strict validation: \
PE %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR}, \
BQ %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED}, \
BW %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE}, \
DB %{MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE}, \
DA %{MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER}, \
HF %{MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
LF %{MULTIPART_LF_LINE}, \
SM %{MULTIPART_SEMICOLON_MISSING}, \
IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING}, \
IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
FE %{MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED}'"</pre><p>The <code class="literal">multipart/form-data</code> parser was upgraded in
      ModSecurity v2.1.3 to actively look for signs of evasion. Many variables
      (as listed above) were added to expose various facts discovered during
      the parsing process. The <code class="literal">MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR</code>
      variable is handy to check on all abnormalities at once. The individual
      variables allow detection to be fine-tuned according to your
      circumstances in order to reduce the number of false positives. Detailed
      analysis of various evasion techniques covered will be released as a
      separated document at a later date.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11072"></a><code class="literal">MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Set to <code class="literal">1</code> when, during the parsing phase of a
      <code class="literal">multipart/request-body</code>, ModSecurity encounters what
      feels like a boundary but it is not. Such an event may occur when
      evasion of ModSecurity is attempted.</p><p>The best way to use this variable is as in the example
      below:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY "!@eq 0" \
"phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Multipart parser detected a possible unmatched boundary.'"</pre><p>Change the rule from blocking to logging-only if many false
      positives are encountered.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11088"></a><code class="literal">PATH_INFO</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Besides passing query information to a script/handler, you can
      also pass additional data, known as extra path information, as part of
      the URL. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> PATH_INFO</em></span> "^/(bin|etc|sbin|opt|usr)"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11095"></a><code class="literal">QUERY_STRING</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds form data passed to the script/handler by
      appending data after a question mark. Warning: Not URL-decoded.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>QUERY_STRING</em></span> "attack"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N110A2"></a><code class="literal">REMOTE_ADDR</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the IP address of the remote client.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REMOTE_ADDR</em></span> "^192\.168\.1\.101$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N110AF"></a><code class="literal">REMOTE_HOST</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>If HostnameLookUps are set to On, then this variable will hold the
      DNS resolved remote host name. If it is set to Off, then it will hold
      the remote IP address. Possible uses for this variable would be to deny
      known bad client hosts or network blocks, or conversely, to allow in
      authorized hosts. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REMOTE_HOST</em></span> "\.evil\.network\org$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N110BC"></a><code class="literal">REMOTE_PORT</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds information on the source port that the client
      used when initiating the connection to our web server. Example: in this
      example, we are evaluating to see if the <code class="literal">REMOTE_PORT</code>
      is less than 1024, which would indicate that the user is a privileged
      user (root).</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REMOTE_PORT</em></span> "@lt 1024" phase:1,log,pass,setenv:remote_port=privileged</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N110CD"></a><code class="literal">REMOTE_USER</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the username of the authenticated user. If
      there are no password (basic|digest) access controls in place, then this
      variable will be empty. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REMOTE_USER</em></span> "admin"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This data will not be available in a proxy-mode deployment as the
      authentication is not local.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N110DF"></a><code class="literal">REQBODY_PROCESSOR</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Built-in processors are <code class="literal">URLENCODED</code>,<code class="literal">
      MULTIPART</code>, and <code class="literal">XML</code>.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> REQBODY_PROCESSOR</em></span> "^XML$ chain
SecRule XML "@validateDTD /opt/apache-frontend/conf/xml.dtd"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N110F8"></a><code class="literal">REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Possible values are 0 (no error) or 1 (error). This variable will
      be set by request body processors (typically the
      <code class="classname">multipart/request-data</code> parser or the XML parser)
      when they fail to properly parse a request payload.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR</em></span> "@eq 1" deny,phase:2</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Your policies <span class="emphasis"><em>must</em></span> have a rule to check
        REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR at the beginning of phase 2. Failure to do so
        will leave the door open for impedance mismatch attacks. It is
        possible, for example, that a payload that cannot be parsed by
        ModSecurity can be successfully parsed by more tolerant parser
        operating in the application. If your policy dictates blocking then
        you should reject the request if error is detected. When operating in
        detection-only mode your rule should alert with high severity when
        request body processing fails.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11110"></a><code class="literal">REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR_MSG</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Empty, or contains the error message from the processor.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR_MSG</em></span> "failed to parse" t:lowercase</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1111D"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_BASENAME</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds just the filename part of
      <code class="literal">REQUEST_FILENAME</code> (e.g. index.php).</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_BASENAME</em></span> "^login\.php$" phase:2,t:none,t:lowercase</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Please note that anti-evasion transformations are not applied to
        this variable by default. <code class="literal">REQUEST_BASENAME</code> will
        recognise both <code class="literal">/</code> and <code class="literal">\</code> as path
        separators.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1113F"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_BODY</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the data in the request body (including
      <code class="literal">POST_PAYLOAD</code> data). <code class="literal">REQUEST_BODY</code>
      should be used if the original order of the arguments is important
      (<code class="literal">ARGS</code> should be used in all other cases).
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_BODY</em></span> "^username=\w{25,}\&amp;password=\w{25,}\&amp;Submit\=login$"</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>This variable is only available if the
        <code class="literal">URLENCODED</code> request body processor parsed a request
        body. This will occur by default when an
        <code class="literal">application/x-www-form-urlencoded</code> is detected, or
        the <code class="literal">URLENCODED</code> request body parser is forced. As of
        2.5.7 it is possible to force the presence of the
        <code class="literal">REQUEST_BODY</code> variable, but only when there is no
        request body processor defined, using the
        <code class="literal">ctl:forceRequestBodyVariable</code> option in the
        <code class="literal">REQUEST_HEADERS</code> phase.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11173"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_COOKIES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable is a collection of all of the cookie data. Example:
      the following example is using the Ampersand special operator to count
      how many variables are in the collection. In this rule, it would trigger
      if the request does not include any Cookie headers.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> &amp;REQUEST_COOKIES</em></span> "@eq 0"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11180"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable is a collection of the cookie names in the request
      headers. Example: the following rule will trigger if the JSESSIONID
      cookie is not present.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> &amp;REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES:JSESSIONID</em></span> "@eq 0"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1118D"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_FILENAME</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the relative <code class="literal">REQUEST_URI</code>
      minus the <code class="literal">QUERY_STRING</code> part (e.g. /index.php).
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_FILENAME</em></span> "^/cgi-bin/login\.php$" phase:2,t:none,t:normalisePath</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Please note that anti-evasion transformations are not used on
        <code class="literal">REQUEST_FILENAME</code> by default.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N111A9"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_HEADERS</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable can be used as either a collection of all of the
      request headers or can be used to specify individual headers (by using
      REQUEST_HEADERS<span class="emphasis"><em>:Header-Name</em></span>). Example: the first
      example uses <code class="literal">REQUEST_HEADERS</code> as a collection and is
      applying the <code class="literal">validateUrlEncoding</code> operator against all
      headers.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_HEADERS</em></span> "@validateUrlEncoding"</pre><p>Example: the second example is targeting only the
      <code class="literal">Host</code> header.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_HEADERS:Host</em></span> "^[\d\.]+$" \
    "deny,log,status:400,msg:'Host header is a numeric IP address'"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N111CD"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable is a collection of the names of all of the request
      headers. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES</em></span> "^x-forwarded-for" \
    "log,deny,status:403,t:lowercase,msg:'Proxy Server Used'"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N111DA"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_LINE</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the complete request line sent to the server
      (including the REQUEST_METHOD and HTTP version data). Example: this
      example rule will trigger if the request method is something other than
      GET, HEAD, POST or if the HTTP is something other than HTTP/0.9, 1.0 or
      1.1.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_LINE</em></span> "!(^((?:(?:pos|ge)t|head))|http/(0\.9|1\.0|1\.1)$)" t:none,t:lowercase</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N111E7"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_METHOD</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the request method used by the client.</p><p>The following example will trigger if the request method is either
      <code class="literal">CONNECT</code> or TRACE.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_METHOD</em></span> "^((?:connect|trace))$" t:none,t:lowercase</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N111FA"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_PROTOCOL</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the request protocol version information.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_PROTOCOL</em></span> "!^http/(0\.9|1\.0|1\.1)$" t:none,t:lowercase</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11207"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_URI</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the full URL including the
      <code class="literal">QUERY_STRING</code> data (e.g. /index.php?p=X), however it
      will never contain a domain name, even if it was provided on the request
      line. It also does not include either the
      <code class="literal">REQUEST_METHOD</code> or the HTTP version info.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>REQUEST_URI</em></span> "attack" phase:1,t:none,t:urlDecode,t:lowercase,t:normalisePath</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Please note that anti-evasion transformations are not used on
        <code class="literal">REQUEST_URI</code> by default.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11225"></a><code class="literal">REQUEST_URI_RAW</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Same as <code class="literal">REQUEST_URI</code> but will contain the domain
      name if it was provided on the request line (e.g.
      http://www.example.com/index.php?p=X).</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> REQUEST_URI_RAW</em></span> "http:/" phase:1,t:none,t:urlDecode,t:lowercase,t:normalisePath</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>Please note that anti-evasion transformations are not used on
        <code class="literal">REQUEST_URI_RAW</code> by default.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1123F"></a><code class="literal">RESPONSE_BODY</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the data for the response payload.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> RESPONSE_BODY</em></span> "ODBC Error Code"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1124E"></a><code class="literal">RESPONSE_CONTENT_LENGTH</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Response body length in bytes. Can be available starting with
      phase 3 but it does not have to be (as the length of response body is
      not always known in advance.) If the size is not known this variable
      will contain a zero. If <code class="literal">RESPONSE_CONTENT_LENGTH</code>
      contains a zero in phase 5 that means the actual size of the response
      body was 0.</p><p>The value of this variable can change between phases if the body
      is modified. For example, in embedded mode
      <code class="literal">mod_deflate</code> can compress the response body between
      phases 4 and 5.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1125F"></a><code class="literal">RESPONSE_CONTENT_TYPE</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Response content type. Only available starting with phase
      3.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11266"></a><code class="literal">RESPONSE_HEADERS</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable is similar to the REQUEST_HEADERS variable and can
      be used in the same manner. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> RESPONSE_HEADERS</em></span><span class="emphasis"><em>:X-Cache</em></span> "MISS"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This variable may not have access to some headers when running in
      embedded-mode. Headers such as Server, Date, Connection and Content-Type
      are added during a later Apache hook just prior to sending the data to
      the client. This data should be available, however, either during
      ModSecurity phase:5 (logging) or when running in proxy-mode.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1127A"></a><code class="literal">RESPONSE_HEADERS_NAMES</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable is a collection of the response header names.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>RESPONSE_HEADERS_NAMES</em></span> "Set-Cookie"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Same limitations as RESPONSE_HEADERS with regards to access to
      some headers in embedded-mode.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1128C"></a><code class="literal">RESPONSE_PROTOCOL</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the HTTP response protocol information.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>RESPONSE_PROTOCOL</em></span> "^HTTP\/0\.9"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11299"></a><code class="literal">RESPONSE_STATUS</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the HTTP response status code as generated by
      Apache. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>RESPONSE_STATUS</em></span> "^[45]"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This directive may not work as expected in embedded-mode as Apache
      handles many of the stock response codes (404, 401, etc...) earlier in
      Phase 2. This variable should work as expected in a proxy-mode
      deployment.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N112AB"></a><code class="literal">RULE</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable provides access to the <code class="literal">id</code>, <code class="literal">rev</code>,
      <code class="literal">severity</code>, <code class="literal">logdata</code>, and <code class="literal">msg</code> fields of the rule that triggered the
      action. Only available for expansion in action strings (e.g.<code class="literal">setvar:tx.varname=%{rule.id}</code>). Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "@eq 0" "log,deny,setvar:tx.varname=<span class="emphasis"><em>%{rule.id}</em></span>"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N112D0"></a><code class="literal">SCRIPT_BASENAME</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds just the local filename part of
      SCRIPT_FILENAME. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>SCRIPT_BASENAME</em></span> "^login\.php$"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This variable is not available in proxy mode.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N112E2"></a><code class="literal">SCRIPT_FILENAME</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the full path on the server to the requested
      script. (e.g. SCRIPT_NAME plus the server path). Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>SCRIPT_FILENAME</em></span> "^/usr/local/apache/cgi-bin/login\.php$"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This variable is not available in proxy mode.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N112F4"></a><code class="literal">SCRIPT_GID</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the group id (numerical value) of the group
      owner of the script. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>SCRIPT_GID</em></span> "!^46$"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This variable is not available in proxy mode.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11306"></a><code class="literal">SCRIPT_GROUPNAME</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the group name of the group owner of the
      script. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> SCRIPT_GROUPNAME</em></span> "!^apache$"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This variable is not available in proxy mode.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11318"></a><code class="literal">SCRIPT_MODE</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the script's permissions mode data (numerical
      - 1=execute, 2=write, 4=read and 7=read/write/execute). Example: will
      trigger if the script has the WRITE permissions set.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>SCRIPT_MODE</em></span> "^(2|3|6|7)$"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This variable is not available in proxy mode.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1132A"></a><code class="literal">SCRIPT_UID</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the user id (numerical value) of the owner of
      the script. Example: the example rule below will trigger if the UID is
      not 46 (the Apache user).</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> SCRIPT_UID</em></span> "!^46$"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This variable is not available in proxy mode.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1133C"></a><code class="literal">SCRIPT_USERNAME</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the username of the owner of the script.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>SCRIPT_USERNAME</em></span> "!^apache$"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This variable is not available in proxy mode.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1134E"></a><code class="literal">SERVER_ADDR</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable contains the IP address of the server.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> SERVER_ADDR</em></span> "^192\.168\.1\.100$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1135B"></a><code class="literal">SERVER_NAME</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable contains the server's hostname or IP address.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>SERVER_NAME</em></span> "hostname\.com$"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This data is taken from the Host header submitted in the client
      request.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1136D"></a><code class="literal">SERVER_PORT</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable contains the local port that the web server is
      listening on. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>SERVER_PORT</em></span> "^80$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1137A"></a><code class="literal">SESSION</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable is a collection, available only after <code class="literal">setsid</code> is executed. Example: the following
      example shows how to initialize a SESSION collection with setsid, how to
      use setvar to increase the session.score values, how to set the
      session.blocked variable and finally how to deny the connection based on
      the session:blocked value.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:PHPSESSID !^$ chain,nolog,pass
SecAction setsid:%{REQUEST_COOKIES.PHPSESSID}
SecRule REQUEST_URI "^/cgi-bin/finger$" \
    "phase:2,t:none,t:lowercase,t:normalisePath,pass,log,setvar:<span class="emphasis"><em>session.score</em></span>=+10"
SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> SESSION:SCORE</em></span> "@gt 50" "pass,log,setvar:<span class="emphasis"><em>session.blocked</em></span>=1"
SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> SESSION:BLOCKED</em></span> "@eq 1" "log,deny,status:403"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11394"></a><code class="literal">SESSIONID</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable is the value set with <code class="literal">setsid</code>. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>SESSIONID</em></span> !^$ chain,nolog,pass
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:PHPSESSID !^$
SecAction setsid:%{REQUEST_COOKIES.PHPSESSID}</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N113A5"></a><code class="literal">TIME</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds a formatted string representing the time
      (hour:minute:second). Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> TIME</em></span> "^(([1](8|9))|([2](0|1|2|3))):\d{2}:\d{2}$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N113B2"></a><code class="literal">TIME_DAY</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the current date (1-31). Example: this rule
      would trigger anytime between the 10th and 20th days of the
      month.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>TIME_DAY</em></span> "^(([1](0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9))|20)$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N113BF"></a><code class="literal">TIME_EPOCH</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the time in seconds since 1970.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>TIME_EPOCH</em></span> "@gt 1000"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N113CC"></a><code class="literal">TIME_HOUR</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the current hour (0-23). Example: this rule
      would trigger during "off hours".</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> TIME_HOUR</em></span> "^(0|1|2|3|4|5|6|[1](8|9)|[2](0|1|2|3))$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N113D9"></a><code class="literal">TIME_MIN</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the current minute (0-59). Example: this rule
      would trigger during the last half hour of every hour.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>TIME_MIN</em></span> "^(3|4|5)"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N113E6"></a><code class="literal">TIME_MON</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the current month (0-11). Example: this rule
      would match if the month was either November (10) or December
      (11).</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> TIME_MON</em></span> "^1"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N113F3"></a><code class="literal">TIME_SEC</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the current second count (0-59).
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>TIME_SEC</em></span> "@gt 30"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11400"></a><code class="literal">TIME_WDAY</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the current weekday (0-6). Example: this rule
      would trigger only on week-ends (Saturday and Sunday).</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>TIME_WDAY</em></span> "^(0|6)$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1140D"></a><code class="literal">TIME_YEAR</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable holds the current four-digit year data.
      Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>TIME_YEAR</em></span> "^2006$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1141A"></a><code class="literal">TX</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Transaction Collection. This is used to store pieces of data,
      create a transaction anomaly score, and so on. Transaction variables are
      set for 1 request/response cycle. The scoring and evaluation will not
      last past the current request/response process. Example: In this
      example, we are using setvar to increase the tx.score value by 5 points.
      We then have a follow-up run that will evaluate the transactional score
      this request and then it will decided whether or not to allow/deny the
      request through.</p><p>The following is a list of reserved names in the TX
      collection:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">TX:0</code> - The matching value
          when using the <code class="literal">@rx</code> or <code class="literal">@pm</code> operator with the <code class="literal">capture</code> action.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">TX:1-TX:9</code> - The captured
          subexpression value when using the <code class="literal">@rx</code> operator with capturing parens and the
          <code class="literal">capture</code> action.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">TX:MSC_.*</code> - ModSecurity
          processing flags.</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="circle"><li><p><code class="literal">MSC_PCRE_LIMITS_EXCEEDED</code> - Set
              non-zero if PCRE match limits are exceeded. See <code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimit</code> and <code class="literal">SecPcreMatchLimitRecursion</code>.</p></li></ul></div></li></ul></div><pre class="programlisting">SecRule WEBSERVER_ERROR_LOG "does not exist" "phase:5,pass,<span class="emphasis"><em>setvar:tx.score=+5</em></span>"
SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> TX:SCORE</em></span> "@gt 20" deny,log</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11462"></a><code class="literal">USERID</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable is the value set with <code class="literal">setuid</code>. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction setuid:%{REMOTE_USER},nolog
SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> USERID</em></span> "Admin"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11473"></a><code class="literal">WEBAPPID</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This variable is the value set with <code class="literal">SecWebAppId</code>. Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecWebAppId "WebApp1"
SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> WEBAPPID</em></span> "WebApp1" "chain,log,deny,status:403"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Transfer-Encoding "!^$"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11484"></a><code class="literal">WEBSERVER_ERROR_LOG</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Contains zero or more error messages produced by the web server.
      Access to this variable is in phase:5 (logging). Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule<span class="emphasis"><em> WEBSERVER_ERROR_LOG</em></span> "File does not exist" "phase:5,setvar:tx.score=+5"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11491"></a><code class="literal">XML</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Can be used standalone (as a target for
      <code class="literal">validateDTD</code> and <code class="literal">validateSchema</code>) or
      with an XPath expression parameter (which makes it a valid target for
      any function that accepts plain text). Example using XPath:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction log,deny,status:403,phase:2
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type ^text/xml$ \
    phase:1,t:lowercase,nolog,pass,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=<span class="emphasis"><em>XML</em></span>
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "<span class="emphasis"><em>!^XML$</em></span>" skipAfter:12345
SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>XML:/employees/employee/name/text()</em></span> Fred
SecRule <span class="emphasis"><em>XML:/xq:employees/employee/name/text()</em></span> Fred \
    id:12345,xmlns:xq=http://www.example.com/employees</pre><p>The first XPath expression does not use namespaces. It would match
      against payload such as this one:</p><pre class="programlisting">&lt;employees&gt;
    &lt;employee&gt;
        &lt;name&gt;Fred Jones&lt;/name&gt;
        &lt;address location="home"&gt;
            &lt;street&gt;900 Aurora Ave.&lt;/street&gt;
            &lt;city&gt;Seattle&lt;/city&gt;
            &lt;state&gt;WA&lt;/state&gt;
            &lt;zip&gt;98115&lt;/zip&gt;
        &lt;/address&gt;
        &lt;address location="work"&gt;
            &lt;street&gt;2011 152nd Avenue NE&lt;/street&gt;
            &lt;city&gt;Redmond&lt;/city&gt;
            &lt;state&gt;WA&lt;/state&gt;
            &lt;zip&gt;98052&lt;/zip&gt;
        &lt;/address&gt;
        &lt;phone location="work"&gt;(425)555-5665&lt;/phone&gt;
        &lt;phone location="home"&gt;(206)555-5555&lt;/phone&gt;
        &lt;phone location="mobile"&gt;(206)555-4321&lt;/phone&gt;
    &lt;/employee&gt;
&lt;/employees&gt;</pre><p>The second XPath expression does use namespaces. It would match
      the following payload:</p><pre class="programlisting">&lt;xq:employees xmlns:xq="http://www.example.com/employees"&gt;
    &lt;employee&gt;
        &lt;name&gt;Fred Jones&lt;/name&gt;
        &lt;address location="home"&gt;
            &lt;street&gt;900 Aurora Ave.&lt;/street&gt;
            &lt;city&gt;Seattle&lt;/city&gt;
            &lt;state&gt;WA&lt;/state&gt;
            &lt;zip&gt;98115&lt;/zip&gt;
        &lt;/address&gt;
        &lt;address location="work"&gt;
            &lt;street&gt;2011 152nd Avenue NE&lt;/street&gt;
            &lt;city&gt;Redmond&lt;/city&gt;
            &lt;state&gt;WA&lt;/state&gt;
            &lt;zip&gt;98052&lt;/zip&gt;
        &lt;/address&gt;
        &lt;phone location="work"&gt;(425)555-5665&lt;/phone&gt;
        &lt;phone location="home"&gt;(206)555-5555&lt;/phone&gt;
        &lt;phone location="mobile"&gt;(206)555-4321&lt;/phone&gt;
    &lt;/employee&gt;
&lt;/xq:employees&gt;</pre><p>Note the different namespace used in the second example.</p><p>To learn more about XPath we suggest the following
      resources:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p><a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xpath" target="_top">XPath
          Standard</a></p></li><li><p><a href="http://www.zvon.org/xxl/XPathTutorial/General/examples.html" target="_top">XPath
          Tutorial</a></p></li></ol></div></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="transformation-functions"></a>Transformation functions</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>When ModSecurity receives request or response information, it makes
    a copy of this data and places it into memory. It is on this data in
    memory that transformation functions are applied. The raw request/response
    data is never altered. Transformation functions are used to transform a
    variable before testing it in a rule.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>There are no default transformation functions as there were in
    previous versions of ModSecurity.</p><p>The following rule will ensure that an attacker does not use mixed
    case in order to evade the ModSecurity rule:</p><p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS:p "xp_cmdshell" <span class="emphasis"><em>"t:lowercase"</em></span></pre>
    multiple transformation actions can be used in the same rule, for example
    the following rule also ensures that an attacker does not use URL encoding
    (%xx encoding) for evasion. Note the order of the transformation
    functions, which ensures that a URL encoded letter is first decoded and
    than translated to lower case.</p><p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS:p "xp_cmdshell" <span class="emphasis"><em>"t:urlDecode,t:lowercase"</em></span></pre></p><p>One can use the SecDefaultAction command to ensure the translation
    occurs for every rule until the next. Note that transformation actions are
    additive, so if a rule explicitly list actions, the translation actions
    set by SecDefaultAction are still performed.</p><p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction <span class="emphasis"><em>t:urlDecode,t:lowercase</em></span></pre></p><p>The following transformation functions are supported:</p><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N114EE"></a><code class="literal">base64Decode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function decodes a base64-encoded string.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N114F5"></a><code class="literal">base64Encode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function encodes input string using base64 encoding.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N114FC"></a><code class="literal">compressWhitespace</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>It converts whitespace characters (32, \f, \t, \n, \r, \v, 160) to
      spaces (ASCII 32) and then compresses multiple consecutive space
      characters into one.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11503"></a>cssDecode</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Decodes CSS-encoded characters, as specified at <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-CSS2/syndata.html" target="_top">http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-CSS2/syndata.html</a>.
      This function uses only up to two bytes in the decoding process, meaning
      it is useful to uncover ASCII characters (that wouldn't normally be
      encoded) encoded using CSS encoding, or to counter evasion which is a
      combination of a backslash and non-hexadecimal characters (e.g.
      <code class="literal">ja\vascript</code> is equivalent to
      <code class="literal">javascript</code>).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11514"></a><code class="literal">escapeSeqDecode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function decode ANSI C escape sequences:<code class="literal"> \a</code>,<code class="literal"> \b</code>,
      <code class="literal">\f</code>, <code class="literal">\n</code>, <code class="literal">\r</code>,
      <code class="literal">\t</code>, <code class="literal">\v</code>, <code class="literal">\\</code>,
      <code class="literal">\?</code>, <code class="literal">\'</code>, <code class="literal">\"</code>,
      <code class="literal">\xHH</code> (hexadecimal), <code class="literal">\0OOO</code> (octal). Invalid encodings are left in
      the output.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1154F"></a><code class="literal">hexDecode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function decodes a hex-encoded string.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11556"></a><code class="literal">hexEncode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function encodes input as hex-encoded string.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1155D"></a><code class="literal">htmlEntityDecode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function decodes HTML entities present in input. The
      following variants are supported:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p><code class="literal">&amp;#xHH</code> and <code class="literal">&amp;#xHH;</code> (where H is any hexadecimal
          number)</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">&amp;#DDD</code> and <code class="literal">&amp;#DDD;</code> (where D is any decimal
          number)</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">&amp;quot</code> and <code class="literal">&amp;quot;</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">&amp;nbsp</code> and <code class="literal">&amp;nbsp;</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">&amp;lt</code> and <code class="literal">&amp;lt;</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">&amp;gt</code> and <code class="literal">&amp;gt;</code></p></li></ul></div><p>This function will convert any entity into a single byte only,
      possibly resulting in a loss of information. It is thus useful to
      uncover bytes that would otherwise not need to be encoded, but it cannot
      do anything with the characters from the range above 255.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1159F"></a><code class="literal">jsDecode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Decodes JavaScript escape sequences. If a
      <code class="literal">\uHHHH</code> code is in the range of
      <code class="literal">FF01</code>-<code class="literal">FF5E</code> (the full width ASCII
      codes), then the higher byte is used to detect and adjust the lower
      byte. Otherwise, only the lower byte will be used and the higher byte
      zeroed.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115B2"></a><code class="literal">length</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function converts the input to its numeric length (count of
      bytes).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115B9"></a><code class="literal">lowercase</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function converts all characters to lowercase using the
      current C locale.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115C0"></a><code class="literal">md5</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function calculates an MD5 hash from input. Note that the
      computed hash is in a raw binary form and may need encoded into text to
      be usable (for example: <code class="literal">t:md5,t:hexEncode</code>).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115CB"></a><code class="literal"><code class="literal">none</code></code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Not an actual transformation function, but an instruction to
      ModSecurity to remove all transformation functions associated with the
      current rule.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115D4"></a><code class="literal">normalisePath</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function will remove multiple slashes, self-references and
      directory back-references (except when they are at the beginning of the
      input).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115DB"></a><code class="literal">normalisePathWin</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Same as <code class="literal">normalisePath</code>, but will first convert
      backslash characters to forward slashes.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115E6"></a><code class="literal">parityEven7bit</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function calculates even parity of 7-bit data replacing the
      8th bit of each target byte with the calculated parity bit.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115ED"></a><code class="literal">parityOdd7bit</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function calculates odd parity of 7-bit data replacing the
      8th bit of each target byte with the calculated parity bit.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115F4"></a><code class="literal">parityZero7bit</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function calculates zero parity of 7-bit data replacing the
      8th bit of each target byte with a zero parity bit which allows
      inspection of even/odd parity 7bit data as ASCII7 data.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N115FB"></a><code class="literal">removeNulls</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function removes NULL bytes from input.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11602"></a><code class="literal">removeWhitespace</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function removes all whitespace characters from input.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11609"></a><code class="literal">replaceComments</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function replaces each occurrence of a C-style comments
      (<code class="literal">/* ... */</code>) with a single space
      (multiple consecutive occurrences of a space will not be compressed).
      Unterminated comments will too be replaced with a space (ASCII 32).
      However, a standalone termination of a comment (<code class="literal">*/</code>) will not be acted upon.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11618"></a><code class="literal">replaceNulls</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function is enabled by default. It replaces NULL bytes in
      input with spaces (ASCII 32).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1161F"></a><code class="literal">urlDecode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function decodes an URL-encoded input string. Invalid
      encodings (i.e. the ones that use non-hexadecimal characters, or the
      ones that are at the end of string and have one or two characters
      missing) will not be converted. If you want to detect invalid encodings
      use the <code class="literal">@validateUrlEncoding</code>
      operator. The transformation function should not be used against
      variables that have already been URL-decoded unless it is your intention
      to perform URL decoding twice!</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1162A"></a><code class="literal">urlDecodeUni</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>In addition to decoding <code class="literal">%xx</code> like <code class="literal">urlDecode, urlDecodeUni</code> also decodes <code class="literal">%uXXXX</code> encoding. If the code is in the range
      of <code class="literal">FF01</code>-<code class="literal">FF5E</code> (the full width ASCII
      codes), then the higher byte is used to detect and adjust the lower
      byte. Otherwise, only the lower byte will be used and the higher byte
      zeroed.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11645"></a><code class="literal">urlEncode</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function encodes input using URL encoding.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1164C"></a><code class="literal">sha1</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function calculates a SHA1 hash from input. Note that the
      computed hash is in a raw binary form and may need encoded to be usable
      (for example: <code class="literal">t:sha1,t:hexEncode</code>).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11657"></a><code class="literal">trimLeft</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function removes whitespace from the left side of
      input.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1165E"></a><code class="literal">trimRight</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function removes whitespace from the right side of
      input.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11665"></a><code class="literal">trim</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>This function removes whitespace from both the left and right
      sides of input.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="actions"></a>Actions</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>Each action belongs to one of five groups:</p><div class="variablelist"><dl><dt><span class="term">Disruptive actions</span></dt><dd><p>Cause ModSecurity to do something. In many cases something
          means block transaction, but not in all. For example, the allow
          action is classified as a disruptive action, but it does the
          opposite of blocking. There can only be one disruptive action per
          rule (if there are multiple disruptive actions present, or
          inherited, only the last one will take effect), or rule chain (in a
          chain, a disruptive action can only appear in the first
          rule).</p></dd><dt><span class="term">Non-disruptive actions</span></dt><dd><p>Do something, but that something does not and cannot affect
          the rule processing flow. Setting a variable, or changing its value
          is an example of a non-disruptive action. Non-disruptive action can
          appear in any rule, including each rule belonging to a chain.</p></dd><dt><span class="term">Flow actions</span></dt><dd><p>These actions affect the rule flow (for example
          <code class="literal">skip</code> or <code class="literal">skipAfter</code>).</p></dd><dt><span class="term">Meta-data actions</span></dt><dd><p>Meta-data actions are used to provide more information about
          rules. Examples include <code class="literal">id</code>,
          <code class="literal">rev</code>, <code class="literal">severity</code> and
          <code class="literal">msg</code>.</p></dd><dt><span class="term">Data actions</span></dt><dd><p>Not really actions, these are mere containers that hold data
          used by other actions. For example, the <code class="literal">status</code>
          action holds the status that will be used for blocking (if it takes
          place).</p></dd></dl></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N116AD"></a><code class="literal">allow</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Stops rule processing on a
      successful match and allows the transaction to proceed.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "^192\.168\.1\.100$" nolog,phase:1,<span class="emphasis"><em>allow</em></span></pre><p>Prior to ModSecurity 2.5 the <code class="literal">allow</code> action would
      only affect the current phase. An <code class="literal">allow</code> in phase 1
      would skip processing the remaining rules in phase 1 but the rules from
      phase 2 would execute. Starting with v2.5.0 <code class="literal">allow</code> was
      enhanced to allow for fine-grained control of what is done. The
      following rules now apply:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>If used one its own, like in the example above,
          <code class="literal">allow</code> will affect the entire transaction,
          stopping processing of the current phase but also skipping over all
          other phases apart from the logging phase. (The logging phase is
          special; it is designed to always execute.)</p></li><li><p>If used with parameter "phase", <code class="literal">allow</code> will
          cause the engine to stop processing the current phase. Other phases
          will continue as normal.</p></li><li><p>If used with parameter "request", <code class="literal">allow</code>
          will cause the engine to stop processing the current phase. The next
          phase to be processed will be phase
          <code class="literal">RESPONSE_HEADERS</code>.</p></li></ol></div><p>Examples:</p><pre class="programlisting"># Do not process request but process response.
SecAction phase:1,allow:request

# Do not process transaction (request and response).
SecAction phase:1,allow
</pre><p>If you want to allow a response through, put a rule in phase
      <code class="literal">RESPONSE_HEADERS</code> and simply use
      <code class="literal">allow</code> on its own:</p><pre class="programlisting"># Allow response through.
SecAction phase:3,allow</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N116FD"></a>append</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Appends text given as parameter
      to the end of response body. For this action to work content injection
      must be enabled by setting <code class="literal">SecContentInjection</code> to
      <code class="literal">On</code>. Also make sure you check the content type of the
      response before you make changes to it (e.g. you don't want to inject
      stuff into images).</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phases:</em></span> 3 and 4.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule RESPONSE_CONTENT_TYPE "^text/html" "nolog,pass,<span class="emphasis"><em>append:'&lt;hr&gt;Footer'</em></span>"</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>While macro expansion is allowed in the additional content, you
        are strongly cautioned against inserting user defined data
        fields.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1171F"></a><code class="literal">auditlog</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Marks the transaction for
      logging in the audit log.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "^192\.168\.1\.100$" <span class="emphasis"><em>auditlog</em></span>,phase:1,allow</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>The auditlog action is now explicit if log is already
      specified.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11739"></a><code class="literal">block</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Performs the default disruptive
      action.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Disruptive</p><p>It is intended to be used by ruleset writers to signify that the
      rule was intended to block and leaves the "how" up to the administrator.
      This action is currently a placeholder which will just be replaced by
      the action from the last <code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code> in the same
      context. Using the <code class="literal">block</code> action with the
      <code class="literal">SecRuleUpdateActionById</code> directive allows a rule to be
      reverted back to the previous <code class="literal">SecDefaultAction</code>
      disruptive action.</p><p>In future versions of ModSecurity, more control and functionality
      will be added to define "how" to block.</p><p>Examples:</p><p>In the following example, the second rule will "deny" because of
      the SecDefaultAction disruptive action. The intent being that the
      administrator could easily change this to another disruptive action
      without editing the actual rules.</p><pre class="programlisting">### Administrator defines "how" to block (deny,status:403)...
SecDefaultAction phase:2,deny,status:403,log,auditlog

### Included from a rulest...
# Intent is to warn for this User Agent
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "perl" "phase:2,<span class="emphasis"><em>pass</em></span>,msg:'Perl based user agent identified'"
# Intent is to block for this User Agent, "how" described in SecDefaultAction
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "nikto" "phase:2,<span class="emphasis"><em>block</em></span>,msg:'Nikto Scanners Identified'"</pre><p>In the following example, The rule is reverted back to the
      <code class="literal">pass</code> action defined in the SecDefaultAction directive
      by using the <code class="literal">SecRuleUpdateActionById</code> directive in
      conjuction with the <code class="literal">block</code> action. This allows an
      administrator to override an action in a 3rd party rule without
      modifying the rule itself.</p><pre class="programlisting">### Administrator defines "how" to block (deny,status:403)...
SecDefaultAction phase:2,pass,log,auditlog

### Included from a rulest...
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "nikto" "id:1,phase:2,<span class="emphasis"><em>deny</em></span>,msg:'Nikto Scanners Identified'"

### Added by the administrator
SecRuleUpdateActionById 1 "<span class="emphasis"><em>block</em></span>"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1177E"></a><code class="literal">capture</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> When used together with the
      regular expression operator, capture action will create copies of
      regular expression captures and place them into the transaction variable
      collection. Up to ten captures will be copied on a successful pattern
      match, each with a name consisting of a digit from 0 to 9.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_BODY "^username=(\w{25,})" phase:2,<span class="emphasis"><em>capture</em></span>,t:none,chain
SecRule TX:1 "(?:(?:a(dmin|nonymous)))"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>The 0 data captures the entire REGEX match and 1 captures the data
      in the first parens, etc...</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11798"></a><code class="literal">chain</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Chains the rule where the action
      is placed with the rule that immediately follows it. The result is
      called a<span class="emphasis"><em> rule chain</em></span>. Chained rules allow for more
      complex rule matches where you want to use a number of different
      VARIABLES to create a better rule and to help prevent false
      positives.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Flow</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting"># Refuse to accept POST requests that do
# not specify request body length. Do note that
# this rule should be preceeded by a rule that verifies
# only valid request methods (e.g. GET, HEAD and POST) are used.
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD ^POST$<span class="emphasis"><em> chain</em></span>,t:none
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length ^$ t:none</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>In programming language concepts, think of chained rules
        somewhat similar to AND conditional statements. The actions specified
        in the first portion of the chained rule will only be triggered if all
        of the variable checks return positive hits. If one aspect of the
        chained rule is negative, then the entire rule chain is negative. Also
        note that disruptive actions, execution phases, metadata actions (id,
        rev, msg), skip and skipAfter actions can only be specified on by the
        chain starter rule.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N117B3"></a><code class="literal">ctl</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> The ctl action allows
      configuration options to be updated for the transaction.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting"># Parse requests with Content-Type "text/xml" as XML 
SecRule REQUEST_CONTENT_TYPE ^text/xml nolog,pass,<span class="emphasis"><em>ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>The following configuration options are supported:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p><code class="literal">auditEngine</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">auditLogParts</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">debugLogLevel</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">ruleRemoveById</code> (single rule
          ID, or a single rule ID range accepted as parameter)</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">requestBodyAccess</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">forceRequestBodyVariable</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">requestBodyLimit</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">requestBodyProcessor</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">responseBodyAccess</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">responseBodyLimit</code></p></li><li><p><code class="literal">ruleEngine</code></p></li></ol></div><p>With the exception of<code class="literal">
      requestBodyProcessor</code> and <code class="literal">
      forceRequestBodyVariable</code>, each configuration option
      corresponds to one configuration directive and the usage is
      identical.</p><p>The <code class="literal">requestBodyProcessor</code> option allows you to
      configure the request body processor. By default ModSecurity will use
      the <code class="literal">URLENCODED</code> and<code class="literal"> MULTIPART</code> processors to process an <code class="literal">application/x-www-form-urlencoded</code> and a
      <code class="literal">multipart/form-data</code> bodies,
      respectively. A third processor, <code class="literal">XML</code>, is also
      supported, but it is never used implicitly. Instead you must tell
      ModSecurity to use it by placing a few rules in the<code class="literal"> REQUEST_HEADERS</code> processing phase. After the
      request body was processed as XML you will be able to use the
      XML-related features to inspect it.</p><p>Request body processors will not interrupt a transaction if an
      error occurs during parsing. Instead they will set variables<code class="literal"> REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR</code> and<code class="literal"> REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR_MSG</code>. These variables
      should be inspected in the <code class="literal">REQUEST_BODY</code> phase and an appropriate action
      taken.</p><p>The <code class="literal">forceRequestBodyVariable</code> option allows you
      to configure the <code class="literal">REQUEST_BODY</code> variable to be set when
      there is no request body processor configured. This allows for
      inspection of request bodies of unknown types.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11847"></a><code class="literal">deny</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Stops rule processing and
      intercepts transaction.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "nikto" "log,<span class="emphasis"><em>deny</em></span>,msg:'Nikto Scanners Identified'"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1185C"></a><code class="literal">deprecatevar</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Decrement counter based on its
      age.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-Disruptive</p><p>Example: The following example will decrement the counter by 60
      every 300 seconds.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction deprecatevar:session.score=60/300</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Counter values are always positive, meaning the value will never
      go below zero.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11873"></a><code class="literal">drop</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Immediately initiate a
      "connection close" action to tear down the TCP connection by sending a
      FIN packet.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Disruptive</p><p>Example: The following example initiates an IP collection for
      tracking Basic Authentication attempts. If the client goes over the
      threshold of more than 25 attempts in 2 minutes, it will DROP subsequent
      connections.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction phase:1,initcol:ip=%{REMOTE_ADDR},nolog
SecRule ARGS:login "!^$" \
    nolog,phase:1,setvar:ip.auth_attempt=+1,deprecatevar:ip.auth_attempt=20/120
SecRule IP:AUTH_ATTEMPT "@gt 25" \
    "log,<span class="emphasis"><em>drop</em></span>,phase:1,msg:'Possible Brute Force Attack'"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This action is currently not available on Windows based builds.
      This action is extremely useful when responding to both Brute Force and
      Denial of Service attacks in that, in both cases, you want to minimize
      both the network bandwidth and the data returned to the client. This
      action causes error message to appear in the log "(9)Bad file
      descriptor: core_output_filter: writing data to the network"</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1188D"></a><code class="literal">exec</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Executes an external
      script/binary supplied as parameter. As of v2.5.0, if the parameter
      supplied to <code class="literal">exec</code> is a Lua script (detected by the
      <code class="filename">.lua</code> extension) the script will be processed
      <span class="emphasis"><em>internally</em></span>. This means you will get direct access
      to the internal request context from the script. Please read the
      <code class="literal">SecRuleScript</code> documentation for more details on how
      to write Lua scripts.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting"># The following is going to execute /usr/local/apache/bin/test.sh
# as a shell script on rule match.
SecRule REQUEST_URI "^/cgi-bin/script\.pl" \
    "phase:2,t:none,t:lowercase,t:normalisePath,log,<span class="emphasis"><em>exec:/usr/local/apache/bin/test.sh</em></span>"

# The following is going to process /usr/local/apache/conf/exec.lua
# internally as a Lua script on rule match.
SecRule ARGS:p attack log,<span class="emphasis"><em>exec:/usr/local/apache/conf/exec.lua</em></span></pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>The exec action is executed independently from any disruptive
        actions. External scripts will always be called with no parameters.
        Some transaction information will be placed in environment variables.
        All the usual CGI environment variables will be there. You should be
        aware that forking a threaded process results in all threads being
        replicated in the new process. Forking can therefore incur larger
        overhead in multi-threaded operation. The script you execute must
        write something (anything) to stdout. If it doesn't ModSecurity will
        assume execution didn't work.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N118B6"></a><code class="literal">expirevar</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Configures a collection variable
      to expire after the given time in seconds.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:JSESSIONID "!^$" nolog,phase:1,pass,chain
SecAction setsid:%{REQUEST_COOKIES:JSESSIONID}
SecRule REQUEST_URI "^/cgi-bin/script\.pl" \
    "phase:2,t:none,t:lowercase,t:normalisePath,log,allow,\
setvar:session.suspicious=1,<span class="emphasis"><em>expirevar:session.suspicious=3600</em></span>,phase:1"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>You should use expirevar actions at the same time that you use
      setvar actions in order to keep the indented expiration time. If they
      are used on their own (perhaps in a SecAction directive) the expire time
      could get re-set. When variables are removed from collections, and there
      are no other changes, collections are not written to disk at the end of
      request. This is because the variables can always be expired again when
      the collection is read again on a subsequent request.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N118D0"></a><code class="literal">id</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Assigns a unique ID to the rule
      or chain.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Meta-data</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "@eq 0" \
    "log,<span class="emphasis"><em>id:60008</em></span>,severity:2,msg:'Request Missing a Host Header'"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>These are the reserved ranges:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p>1-99,999; reserved for local (internal) use. Use as you see
          fit but do not use this range for rules that are distributed to
          others.</p></li><li><p>100,000-199,999; reserved for internal use of the engine, to
          assign to rules that do not have explicit IDs.</p></li><li><p>200,000-299,999; reserved for rules published at
          modsecurity.org.</p></li><li><p>300,000-399,999; reserved for rules published at
          gotroot.com.</p></li><li><p>400,000-419,999; unused (available for reservation).</p></li><li><p>420,000-429,999; reserved for <a href="http://projects.otaku42.de/wiki/ScallyWhack" target="_top">ScallyWhack</a>.</p></li><li><p>430,000-699,999; unused (available for reservation).</p></li><li><p>700,000-799,999; reserved for Ivan Ristic.</p></li><li><p>900,000-999,999; reserved for the <a href="http://www.modsecurity.org/projects/rules/" target="_top">Core Rules</a>
          project.</p></li><li><p>1,000,000 and above; unused (available for
          reservation).</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11912"></a><code class="literal">initcol</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Initialises a named persistent
      collection, either by loading data from storage or by creating a new
      collection in memory.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example: The following example initiates IP address
      tracking.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction <span class="emphasis"><em>phase:1,initcol:ip=%{REMOTE_ADDR}</em></span>,nolog</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Normally you will want to use <span class="emphasis"><em>phase:1</em></span> along
      with <span class="emphasis"><em>initcol</em></span> so that the collection is available in
      all phases.</p><p>Collections are loaded into memory when the initcol action is
      encountered. The collection in storage will be persisted (and the
      appropriate counters increased) <span class="emphasis"><em>only</em></span> if it was
      changed during transaction processing.</p><p>See the "Persistant Storage" section for further details.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11939"></a><code class="literal">log</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Indicates that a successful
      match of the rule needs to be logged.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction phase:1,initcol:ip=%{REMOTE_ADDR},<span class="emphasis"><em>log</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This action will log matches to the Apache error log file and the
      ModSecurity audit log.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11952"></a><code class="literal">logdata</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Allows a data fragment to be
      logged as part of the alert message.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;ARGS:p "@eq 0" "log,<span class="emphasis"><em>logdata:'%{TX.0}'"</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>The logdata information appears in the error and/or audit log
      files and is not sent back to the client in response headers. Macro
      expansion is preformed so you may use variable names such as %{TX.0},
      etc. The information is properly escaped for use with logging binary
      data.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N1196B"></a><code class="literal">msg</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Assigns a custom message to the
      rule or chain.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Meta-data</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "@eq 0" \
    "log,id:60008<span class="emphasis"><em>,</em></span>severity:2,<span class="emphasis"><em>msg:'Request Missing a Host Header'"</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>The msg information appears in the error and/or audit log files
      and is not sent back to the client in response headers.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11987"></a><code class="literal">multiMatch</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> If enabled ModSecurity will
      perform multiple operator invocations for every target, before and after
      every anti-evasion transformation is performed.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction log,deny,phase:1,t:removeNulls,t:lowercase
SecRule ARGS "attack" <span class="emphasis"><em>multiMatch</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Normally, variables are evaluated once, only after all
      transformation functions have completed. With multiMatch, variables are
      checked against the operator before and after every transformation
      function that changes the input.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N119A0"></a><code class="literal">noauditlog</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Indicates that a successful
      match of the rule should not be used as criteria whether the transaction
      should be logged to the audit log.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "Test" allow,<span class="emphasis"><em>noauditlog</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>If the SecAuditEngine is set to On, all of the transactions will
      be logged. If it is set to RelevantOnly, then you can control it with
      the noauditlog action. Even if the noauditlog action is applied to a
      specific rule and a rule either before or after triggered an audit
      event, then the transaction will be logged to the audit log. The correct
      way to disable audit logging for the entire transaction is to use
      "<code class="literal">ctl:auditEngine=Off</code>"</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N119BD"></a><code class="literal">nolog</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Prevents rule matches from
      appearing in both the error and audit logs.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "Test" allow,<span class="emphasis"><em>nolog</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>The nolog action also implies noauditlog.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N119D6"></a><code class="literal">pass</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Continues processing with the
      next rule in spite of a successful match.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Disruptive</p><p>Example1:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "Test" log,<span class="emphasis"><em>pass</em></span></pre><p>When using <span class="emphasis"><em>pass</em></span> with SecRule with multiple
      targets, <span class="emphasis"><em>all</em></span> targets will be processed and
      <span class="emphasis"><em>all</em></span> non-disruptive actions will trigger for
      <span class="emphasis"><em>every</em></span> match found. In the second example the
      TX:test target would be incremented by 1 for each matching
      argument.</p><p>Example2:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS "test" log,<span class="emphasis"><em>pass</em></span>,setvar:TX.test=+1</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>The transaction will not be interrupted but a log will be
      generated for each matching target (unless logging has been
      suppressed).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11A05"></a><code class="literal">pause</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Pauses transaction processing
      for the specified number of milliseconds.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "Test" log,deny,status:403,<span class="emphasis"><em>pause:5000</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This feature can be of limited benefit for slowing down Brute
      Force Scanners, however use with care. If you are under a Denial of
      Service type of attack, the pause feature may make matters worse as this
      feature will cause child processes to sit idle until the pause is
      completed.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11A1E"></a><code class="literal">phase</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Places the rule (or the rule
      chain) into one of five available processing phases.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Meta-data</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction log,deny,<span class="emphasis"><em>phase:1</em></span>,t:removeNulls,t:lowercase
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "Test" log,deny,status:403</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Keep in mind that is you specify the incorrect phase, the target
      variable that you specify may be empty. This could lead to a false
      negative situation where your variable and operator (RegEx) may be
      correct, but it misses malicious data because you specified the wrong
      phase.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11A38"></a>prepend</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Prepends text given as parameter
      to the response body. For this action to work content injection must be
      enabled by setting <code class="literal">SecContentInjection</code> to
      <code class="literal">On</code>. Also make sure you check the content type of the
      response before you make changes to it (e.g. you don't want to inject
      stuff into images).</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Processing Phases:</em></span> 3 and 4.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule RESPONSE_CONTENT_TYPE ^text/html "phase:3,nolog,pass,<span class="emphasis"><em>prepend:'Header&lt;br&gt;'</em></span>"</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>While macro expansion is allowed in the additional content, you
        are strongly cautioned against inserting user defined data
        fields.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11A5A"></a><code class="literal">proxy</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Intercepts transaction by
      forwarding request to another web server using the proxy backend.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "Test" log,<span class="emphasis"><em>proxy:http://www.honeypothost.com/</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>For this action to work, mod_proxy must also be installed. This
      action is useful if you would like to proxy matching requests onto a
      honeypot webserver.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11A73"></a><code class="literal">redirect</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Intercepts transaction by
      issuing a redirect to the given location.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "Test" \
    log,<span class="emphasis"><em>redirect:http://www.hostname.com/failed.html</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>If the <code class="literal">status</code> action is present
      and its value is acceptable (301, 302, 303, or 307) it will be used for
      the redirection. Otherwise status code 302 will be used.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11A90"></a><code class="literal">rev</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Specifies rule revision.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Meta-data</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "^PUT$" "id:340002,<span class="emphasis"><em>rev:1</em></span>,severity:2,msg:'Restricted HTTP function'"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This action is used in combination with the <code class="literal">id</code> action to allow the same rule ID to be used
      after changes take place but to still provide some indication the rule
      changed.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11AAE"></a><code class="literal">sanitiseArg</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Sanitises (replaces each byte
      with an asterisk) a named request argument prior to audit
      logging.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction nolog,phase:2,<span class="emphasis"><em>sanitiseArg:password</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>The sanitize actions do not sanitize any data within the actual
      raw requests but only on the copy of data within memory that is set to
      log to the audit log. It will not sanitize the data in the
      modsec_debug.log file (if the log level is set high enough to capture
      this data).</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11AC7"></a><code class="literal">sanitiseMatched</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Sanitises the variable (request
      argument, request header, or response header) that caused a rule
      match.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example: This action can be used to sanitise arbitrary transaction
      elements when they match a condition. For example, the example below
      will sanitise any argument that contains the word<span class="emphasis"><em>
      password</em></span> in the name.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS_NAMES password nolog,pass,<span class="emphasis"><em>sanitiseMatched</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Same note as sanitiseArg.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11AE3"></a><code class="literal">sanitiseRequestHeader</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Sanitises a named request
      header.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example: This will sanitise the data in the Authorization
      header.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction log,phase:1,<span class="emphasis"><em>sanitiseRequestHeader:Authorization</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Same note as sanitiseArg.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11AFC"></a><code class="literal">sanitiseResponseHeader</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Sanitises a named response
      header.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example: This will sanitise the Set-Cookie data sent to the
      client.</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction log,phase:3,<span class="emphasis"><em>sanitiseResponseHeader:Set-Cookie</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Same note as sanitiseArg.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11B15"></a><code class="literal">severity</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Assigns severity to the rule it
      is placed with.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Meta-data</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "^PUT$" "id:340002,rev:1,<span class="emphasis"><em>severity:CRITICAL</em></span>,msg:'Restricted HTTP function'"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Severity values in ModSecurity follow those of syslog, as
      below:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p>0 - EMERGENCY</p></li><li><p>1 - ALERT</p></li><li><p>2 - CRITICAL</p></li><li><p>3 - ERROR</p></li><li><p>4 - WARNING</p></li><li><p>5 - NOTICE</p></li><li><p>6 - INFO</p></li><li><p>7 - DEBUG</p></li></ul></div><p>It is possible to specify severity levels using either the
      numerical values or the text values. You should always specify severity
      levels using the text values. The use of the numerical values is
      deprecated (as of v2.5.0) and may be removed in one of the susequent
      major updates.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11B4A"></a><code class="literal">setuid</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Special-purpose action that
      initialises the <code class="literal">USER</code>
      collection.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction <span class="emphasis"><em>setuid:%{REMOTE_USER}</em></span>,nolog</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>After initialisation takes place the variable <code class="literal">USERID</code> will be available for use in the
      subsequent rules.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11B6C"></a><code class="literal">setsid</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Special-purpose action that
      initialises the <code class="literal">SESSION</code>
      collection.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group: </em></span>Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting"># Initialise session variables using the session cookie value 
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:PHPSESSID !^$ chain,nolog,pass
SecAction <span class="emphasis"><em>setsid:%{REQUEST_COOKIES.PHPSESSID}</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>On first invocation of this action the collection will be empty
      (not taking the predefined variables into account - see <code class="literal">initcol</code> for more information). On subsequent
      invocations the contents of the collection (session, in this case) will
      be retrieved from storage. After initialisation takes place the
      variable<code class="literal"> SESSIONID</code> will be available
      for use in the subsequent rules.This action understands each application
      maintains its own set of sessions. It will utilise the current web
      application ID to create a session namespace.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11B91"></a><code class="literal">setenv</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Creates, removes, or updates an
      environment variable.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Examples:</p><p>To create a new variable (if you omit the value <code class="literal">1</code> will be used):</p><pre class="programlisting">setenv:name=value</pre><p>To remove a variable:</p><pre class="programlisting">setenv:!name</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>This action can be used to establish communication with other
      Apache modules.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11BB3"></a><code class="literal">setvar</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Creates, removes, or updates a
      variable in the specified collection.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Examples:</p><p>To create a new variable:</p><pre class="programlisting">setvar:tx.score=10</pre><p>To remove a variable prefix the name with exclamation mark:</p><pre class="programlisting">setvar:!tx.score</pre><p>To increase or decrease variable value use <code class="literal">+</code> and <code class="literal">-</code>
      characters in front of a numerical value:</p><pre class="programlisting">setvar:tx.score=+5</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11BD9"></a><code class="literal">skip</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Skips one or more rules (or
      chains) on successful match.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Flow</p><p>Example:</p><p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_URI "^/$" \
"phase:2,chain,t:none<span class="emphasis"><em>,skip:2</em></span>"
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "^127\.0\.0\.1$" "chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "^Apache \(internal dummy connection\)$" "t:none"  
SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "@eq 0" \
    "deny,log,status:400,id:960008,severity:4,msg:'Request Missing a Host Header'"
SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS:Accept "@eq 0" \
    "log,deny,log,status:400,id:960015,msg:'Request Missing an Accept Header'"</pre></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Skip only applies to the current processing phase and not
      necessarily the order in which the rules appear in the configuration
      file. If you group rules by processing phases, then skip should work as
      expected. This action can not be used to skip rules within one chain.
      Accepts a single parameter denoting the number of rules (or chains) to
      skip.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11BF4"></a><code class="literal">skipAfter</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Skips rules (or chains) on
      successful match resuming rule execution after the specified rule ID or
      marker (see <code class="literal">SecMarker</code>) is found.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Flow</p><p>Example:</p><p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_URI "^/$" "chain,t:none,<span class="emphasis"><em>skipAfter:960015</em></span>"
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "^127\.0\.0\.1$" "chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "^Apache \(internal dummy connection\)$" "t:none"  
SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "@eq 0" \
    "deny,log,status:400,id:960008,severity:4,msg:'Request Missing a Host Header'"
SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS:Accept "@eq 0" \
    "log,deny,log,status:400,id:960015,msg:'Request Missing an Accept Header'"</pre></p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p><code class="literal">SkipAfter</code> only applies to the current
      processing phase and not necessarily the order in which the rules appear
      in the configuration file. If you group rules by processing phases, then
      skip should work as expected. This action can not be used to skip rules
      within one chain. Accepts a single parameter denoting the last rule ID
      to skip.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11C16"></a><code class="literal">status</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Specifies the response status
      code to use with actions<code class="literal"> deny</code>
      and<code class="literal"> redirect</code>.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Data</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction log,deny,<span class="emphasis"><em>status:403</em></span>,phase:1</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Status actions defined in Apache scope locations (such as
      Directory, Location, etc...) may be superseded by phase:1 action
      settings. The Apache ErrorDocument directive will be triggered if
      present in the configuration. Therefore if you have previously defined a
      custom error page for a given status then it will be executed and its
      output presented to the user.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11C38"></a><code class="literal">t</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This action can be used which
      transformation function should be used against the specified variables
      before they (or the results, rather) are run against the operator
      specified in the rule.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Non-disruptive</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction log,deny,phase:1,t:removeNulls,t:lowercase 
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:SESSIONID "47414e81cbbef3cf8366e84eeacba091" \
    log,deny,status:403,<span class="emphasis"><em>t:md5,t:hexEncode</em></span></pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Any transformation functions that you specify in a SecRule will be
      in addition to previous ones specified in SecDefaultAction. Use of
      "t:none" will remove all transformation functions for the specified
      rule.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11C51"></a><code class="literal">tag</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Assigns custom text to a rule or
      chain.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Meta-data</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "\b(?:n(?:map|et|c)|w(?:guest|sh)|cmd(?:32)?|telnet|rcmd|ftp)\.exe\b" \
    "t:none,t:lowercase,deny,msg:'System Command Access',id:'950002',<span class="emphasis"><em>\
tag:'WEB_ATTACK/FILE_INJECTION',tag:'OWASP/A2'</em></span>,severity:'2'"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>The tag information appears in the error and/or audit log files.
      Its intent is to be used to automate classification of rules and the
      alerts generated by rules. Multiple tags can be used per
      rule/chain.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11C6B"></a><code class="literal">xmlns</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This action should be used
      together with an XPath expression to register a namespace.</p><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Action Group:</em></span> Data</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "text/xml" \
    "phase:1,pass,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML,ctl:requestBodyAccess=On,<span class="emphasis"><em> \
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"</em></span>
SecRule XML:/soap:Envelope/soap:Body/q1:getInput/id() "123" phase:2,deny</pre></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="operators"></a>Operators</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>A number of operators can be used in rules, as documented below. The
    operator syntax uses the <code class="literal">@</code> symbol followed by the
    specific operator name.</p><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11C8A"></a><code class="literal">beginsWith</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a string
      comparison and returns true if the parameter value is found at the
      beginning of the input. Macro expansion is performed so you may use
      variable names such as <code class="literal">%{TX.1}</code>, etc.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_LINE "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@beginsWith GET</em></span>" t:none,deny,status:403
SecRule REQUEST_ADDR "^(.*)\.\d+$" deny,status:403,capture,chain
SecRule ARGS:gw "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@beginsWith %{TX.1}</em></span>"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11CA2"></a><code class="literal">contains</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a string
      comparison and returns true if the parameter value is found anywhere in
      the input. Macro expansion is performed so you may use variable names
      such as %{TX.1}, etc.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_LINE "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@contains .php</em></span>" t:none,deny,status:403
SecRule REQUEST_ADDR "^(.*)$" deny,status:403,capture,chain
SecRule ARGS:ip "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@contains %{TX.1}</em></span>"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11CB6"></a><code class="literal">endsWith</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a string
      comparison and returns true if the parameter value is found at the end
      of the input. Macro expansion is performed so you may use variable names
      such as %{TX.1}, etc.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_LINE "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@endsWith HTTP/1.1</em></span>" t:none,deny,status:403
SecRule ARGS:route "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@endsWith %{REQUEST_ADDR}</em></span>" t:none,deny,status:403</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11CCA"></a><code class="literal">eq</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a numerical
      comparison and stands for "equal to."</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES "<span class="emphasis"><em>@eq</em></span> 15"</pre><p>Macro expansion is performed so you may use variable names such as
      <code class="literal">%{TX.1}</code>, etc.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11CE1"></a><code class="literal">ge</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a numerical
      comparison and stands for "greater than or equal to."</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES "<span class="emphasis"><em>@ge</em></span> 15"</pre><p>Macro expansion is performed so you may use variable names such as
      <code class="literal">%{TX.1}</code>, etc.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11CF8"></a><code class="literal">geoLookup</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator looks up various
      data fields from an IP address or hostname in the target data. The
      results will be captured in the <code class="literal">GEO</code>
      collection.</p><p>You must provide a database via <code class="literal">SecGeoLookupDb</code> before this operator can be
      used.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>This operator matches and the action is executed on a <span class="emphasis"><em>
        successful</em></span> lookup. For this reason, you probably want to
        use the <span class="emphasis"><em>pass,nolog</em></span> actions. This allows for
        <code class="literal">setvar</code> and other non-disruptive
        actions to be executed on a match. If you wish to block on a failed
        lookup, then do something like this (look for an empty GEO
        collection):</p><pre class="programlisting">SecGeoLookupDb /usr/local/geo/data/GeoLiteCity.dat
...
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@geoLookup" "pass,nolog"
SecRule &amp;GEO "@eq 0" "deny,status:403,msg:'Failed to lookup IP'"</pre></div><p>See the <code class="literal">GEO</code> variable for an
      example and more information on various fields available.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11D21"></a><code class="literal">gt</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a numerical
      comparison and stands for "greater than."</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES "<span class="emphasis"><em>@gt</em></span> 15"</pre><p>Macro expansion is performed so you may use variable names such as
      <code class="literal">%{TX.1}</code>, etc.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11D38"></a><code class="literal">inspectFile</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Executes the external
      script/binary given as parameter to the operator against every file
      extracted from the request. As of v2.5.0, if the supplied filename is
      not absolute it is treated as relative to the directory in which the
      configuration file resides. Also as of v2.5.0, if the filename is
      determined to be a Lua script (based on its extension) the script will
      be processed by the internal engine. As such it will have full access to
      the ModSecurity context.</p><p>Example of using an external binary/script:</p><pre class="programlisting"># Execute external script to validate uploaded files.
SecRule FILES_TMPNAMES "<span class="emphasis"><em>@inspectFile</em></span> /opt/apache/bin/inspect_script.pl"</pre><p>Example of using Lua script:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule FILES_TMPNANMES "@inspectFile <span class="emphasis"><em>inspect.lua</em></span>"</pre><p>Script <code class="filename">inspect.lua</code>:</p><pre class="programlisting">function main(filename)
    -- Do something to the file to verify it. In this example, we
    -- read up to 10 characters from the beginning of the file.
    local f = io.open(filename, "rb");
    local d = f:read(10);
    f:close();
   
    -- Return null if there is no reason to believe there is ansything
    -- wrong with the file (no match). Returning any text will be taken
    -- to mean a match should be trigerred.
    return null;
end</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11D5A"></a><code class="literal">le</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a numerical
      comparison and stands for "less than or equal to."</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES "<span class="emphasis"><em>@le</em></span> 15"</pre><p>Macro expansion is performed so you may use variable names such as
      <code class="literal">%{TX.1}</code>, etc.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11D71"></a><code class="literal">lt</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a numerical
      comparison and stands for "less than."</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule &amp;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES "<span class="emphasis"><em>@lt</em></span> 15"</pre><p>Macro expansion is performed so you may use variable names such as
      <code class="literal">%{TX.1}</code>, etc.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11D88"></a><code class="literal">pm</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Phrase Match operator. This
      operator uses a set based matching engine (Aho-Corasick) for faster
      matches of keyword lists. It will match any one of its arguments
      anywhere in the target value. The match is case insensitive.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "<span class="emphasis"><em>@pm</em></span> WebZIP WebCopier Webster WebStripper SiteSnagger ProWebWalker CheeseBot" "deny,status:403</pre><p>The above would deny access with 403 if any of the words matched
      within the User-Agent HTTP header value.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11D9B"></a><code class="literal">pmFromFile</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Phrase Match operator. This
      operator uses a set based matching engine (Aho-Corasick) for faster
      matches of keyword lists. This operator is the same as
      <code class="literal">@pm</code> except that it takes a list of files as
      arguments. It will match any one of the phrases listed in the file(s)
      anywhere in the target value.</p><p>Notes:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>The contents of the files should be one phrase per line. End
          of line markers will be stripped from the phrases (LF and CRLF), and
          whitespace is trimmed from both sides of the phrases. Empty lines
          and comment lines (beginning with a '#') are ignored.</p></li><li><p>To allow easier inclusion of phrase files with rulesets,
          relative paths may be used to the phrase files. In this case, the
          path of the file containing the rule is prepended to the phrase file
          path.</p></li><li><p>To allow easier matching of whole IP addresses, you can add
          boundary characters to the phrases. For example, use "/1.2.3.4/"
          instead of "1.2.3.4". You can then insert these characters into the
          target prior to a match:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecAction "phase:1,pass,nolog,setvar:tx.remote_addr=/%{REMOTE_ADDR}/"
SecRule TX:REMOTE_ADDR "<span class="emphasis"><em>@pmFromFile ip-blacklist.txt</em></span>" "deny,status:403

# ip-blacklist.txt contents:
# NOTE: All IPs must be prefixed/suffixed with "/" as the rules
#       will add in this character as a boundary to ensure
#       the entire IP is matched.
# SecAction "phase:1,pass,nolog,setvar:tx.remote_addr='/%{REMOTE_ADDR}/'"
/1.2.3.4/
/5.6.7.8/</pre></li></ol></div><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "<span class="emphasis"><em>@pm</em></span> /path/to/blacklist1 blacklist2" "deny,status:403</pre><p>The above would deny access with 403 if any of the patterns in the
      two files matched within the User-Agent HTTP header value. The
      <code class="literal">blacklist2</code> file would need to be placed in the same
      path as the file containing the rule.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11DCA"></a><code class="literal">rbl</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Look up the parameter in the RBL
      given as parameter. Parameter can be an IPv4 address, or a
      hostname.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "<span class="emphasis"><em>@rbl</em></span> sc.surbl.org"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11DDB"></a><code class="literal">rx</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Regular expression operator.
      This is the default operator, so if the "@" operator is not defined, it
      is assumed to be rx.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "<span class="emphasis"><em>@rx</em></span> nikto"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>Regular expressions are handled by the PCRE library (<a href="http://www.pcre.org" target="_top">http://www.pcre.org</a>). ModSecurity
      compiles its regular expressions with the following settings:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>The entire input is treated as a single line, even when there
          are newline characters present.</p></li><li><p>All matches are case-sensitive. If you do not care about case
          sensitivity you either need to implement the <code class="literal">lowercase</code> transformation function, or use
          the per-pattern<code class="literal">(?i)</code>modifier, as
          allowed by PCRE.</p></li><li><p>The <code class="literal">PCRE_DOTALL</code> and
          <code class="literal">PCRE_DOLLAR_ENDONLY</code> flags are set
          during compilation, meaning a single dot will match any character,
          including the newlines and a <code class="literal">$</code>
          end anchor will not match a trailing newline character.</p></li></ol></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11E15"></a><code class="literal">streq</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a string
      comparison and returns true if the parameter value matches the input
      exactly. Macro expansion is performed so you may use variable names such
      as %{TX.1}, etc.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS:foo "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@streq bar</em></span>" t:none,deny,status:403
SecRule REQUEST_ADDR "^(.*)$" deny,status:403,capture,chain
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Ip-Address "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@streq %{TX.1}</em></span>"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11E29"></a><code class="literal">validateByteRange</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Validates the byte range used in
      the variable falls into the specified range.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS:text "<span class="emphasis"><em>@validateByteRange</em></span> 10, 13, 32-126"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>You can force requests to consist only of bytes from a certain
      byte range. This can be useful to avoid stack overflow attacks (since
      they usually contain "random" binary content). Default range values are
      0 and 255, i.e. all byte values are allowed. This directive does not
      check byte range in a POST payload when
      <code class="literal">multipart/form-data</code> encoding (file upload) is used.
      Doing so would prevent binary files from being uploaded. However, after
      the parameters are extracted from such request they are checked for a
      valid range.</p><p>validateByteRange is similar to the ModSecurity 1.X
      SecFilterForceByteRange Directive however since it works in a rule
      context, it has the following differences:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p>You can specify a different range for different
          variables.</p></li><li><p>It has an "event" context (id, msg....)</p></li><li><p>It is executed in the flow of rules rather than being a built
          in pre-check.</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11E4F"></a><code class="literal">validateDTD</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Validates the DOM tree generated
      by the XML request body processor against the supplied DTD.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction log,deny,status:403,phase:2
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type ^text/xml$ \
    phase:1,t:lowercase,nolog,pass,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "!^XML$" nolog,pass,skipAfter:12345
SecRule XML "<span class="emphasis"><em>@validateDTD /path/to/apache2/conf/xml.dtd</em></span>" "deny,id:12345"</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>This operator requires request body to be processed as
        XML.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11E63"></a><code class="literal">validateSchema</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Validates the DOM tree generated
      by the XML request body processor against the supplied XML
      Schema.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecDefaultAction log,deny,status:403,phase:2
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type ^text/xml$ \
    phase:1,t:lowercase,nolog,pass,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "!^XML$" nolog,pass,skipAfter:12345
SecRule XML "<span class="emphasis"><em>@validateSchema /path/to/apache2/conf/xml.xsd</em></span>" "deny,id:12345"</pre><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>This operator requires request body to be processed as
        XML.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11E77"></a><code class="literal">validateUrlEncoding</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Verifies the encodings used in
      the variable (if any) are valid.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS "<span class="emphasis"><em>@validateUrlEncoding</em></span>"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>URL encoding is an HTTP standard for encoding byte values within a
      URL. The byte is escaped with a % followed by two hexadecimal values
      (0-F). This directive does not check encoding in a POST payload when the
      <code class="literal">multipart/form-data</code> encoding (file upload) is used.
      It is not necessary to do so because URL encoding is not used for this
      encoding.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11E91"></a><code class="literal">validateUtf8Encoding</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> Verifies the variable is a valid
      UTF-8 encoded string.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS "<span class="emphasis"><em>@validateUtf8Encoding</em></span>"</pre><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Note</em></span></p><p>UTF-8 encoding is valid on most web servers. Integer values
      between 0-65535 are encoded in a UTF-8 byte sequence that is escaped by
      percents. The short form is two bytes in length.</p><p>check for three types of errors:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li><p>Not enough bytes. UTF-8 supports two, three, four, five, and
          six byte encodings. ModSecurity will locate cases when a byte or
          more is missing.</p></li><li><p>Invalid encoding. The two most significant bits in most
          characters are supposed to be fixed to 0x80. Attackers can use this
          to subvert Unicode decoders.</p></li><li><p>Overlong characters. ASCII characters are mapped directly into
          the Unicode space and are thus represented with a single byte.
          However, most ASCII characters can also be encoded with two, three,
          four, five, and six characters thus tricking the decoder into
          thinking that the character is something else (and, presumably,
          avoiding the security check).</p></li></ul></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11EB3"></a><code class="literal">verifyCC</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator verifies a given
      regular expression as a potential credit card number. It first matches
      with a single generic regular expression then runs the resulting match
      through a Luhn checksum algorithm to further verify it as a potential
      credit card number.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule ARGS "<span class="emphasis"><em>@verifyCC \d{13,16}</em></span>" \
              "phase:2,sanitiseMatched,log,auditlog,pass,msg:'Potential credit card number'"</pre></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11EC4"></a><code class="literal">within</code></h3></div></div><div></div></div><p><span class="emphasis"><em>Description:</em></span> This operator is a string
      comparison and returns true if the input value is found anywhere within
      the parameter value. Note that this is similar to
      <code class="literal">@contains</code>, except that the target and match values
      are reversed. Macro expansion is performed so you may use variable names
      such as %{TX.1}, etc.</p><p>Example:</p><pre class="programlisting">SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@within get,post,head</em></span>" t:lowercase,deny,status:403

SecAction "pass,setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=get,post,head'"
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "!<span class="emphasis"><em>@within %{tx.allowed_methods}</em></span>" t:lowercase,deny,status:403</pre></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="N11EDC"></a>Macro Expansion</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>Macros allow for using place holders in rules that will be expanded
    out to their values at runtime. Currently only variable expansion is
    supported, however more options may be added in future versions of
    ModSecurity.</p><p>Format:</p><pre class="programlisting">%{VARIABLE}
%{COLLECTION.VARIABLE}</pre><p>Macro expansion can be used in actions such as initcol, setsid,
    setuid, setvar, setenv, logdata. Operators that are evaluated at runtime
    support expansion and are noted above. Such operators include @beginsWith,
    @endsWith, @contains, @within and @streq. You cannot use macro expansion
    for operators that are "compiled" such as @pm, @rx, etc. as these
    operators have their values fixed at configure time for efficiency.</p><p>Some values you may want to expand include: TX, REMOTE_ADDR, USERID,
    HIGHEST_SEVERITY, MATCHED_VAR, MATCHED_VAR_NAME, MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR,
    RULE, SESSION, USERID, among others.</p></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="N11EEA"></a>Persistant Storage</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p>At this time it is only possible to have three collections in which
    data is stored persistantly (i.e. data available to multiple requests).
    These are: <code class="literal">IP</code>, <code class="literal"> SESSION</code> and <code class="literal">USER</code>.</p><p>Every collection contains several built-in variables that are
    available and are read-only unless otherwise specified:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p><code class="literal">CREATE_TIME</code> - date/time of
        the creation of the collection.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">IS_NEW</code> - set to 1 if the
        collection is new (not yet persisted) otherwise set to 0.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">KEY</code> - the value of the
        initcol variable (the client's IP address in the example).</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">LAST_UPDATE_TIME</code> - date/time
        of the last update to the collection.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">TIMEOUT</code> - date/time in
        seconds when the collection will be updated on disk from memory (if no
        other updates occur). This variable may be set if you wish to specifiy
        an explicit expiration time (default is 3600 seconds).</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">UPDATE_COUNTER</code> - how many
        times the collection has been updated since creation.</p></li><li><p><code class="literal">UPDATE_RATE</code> - is the average
        rate updates per minute since creation.</p></li></ol></div><p>To create a collection to hold session variables (<code class="literal">SESSION</code>) use action <code class="literal">setsid</code>. To create a collection to hold user
    variables (<code class="literal">USER</code>) use action <code class="literal">setuid</code>. To create a collection to hold client
    address variables (<code class="literal">IP</code>) use action
    <code class="literal">initcol</code>.</p><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>ModSecurity implements atomic updates of persistent variables only
      for integer variables (counters) at this time. Variables are read from
      storage whenever <code class="literal">initcol</code> is encountered in the rules
      and persisted at the end of request processing. Counters are adjusted by
      applying a delta generated by re-reading the persisted data just before
      being persisted. This keeps counter data consistent even if the counter
      was modified and persisted by another thread/process during the
      transaction.</p></div><div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"><h3 class="title">Note</h3><p>ModSecurity uses a Berkley Database (SDBM) for persistant storage.
      This type of database is generally limited to storing a maximum of 1008
      bytes per key. This may be a limitation if you are attempting to store a
      considerable amount of data in variables for a single key. Some of this
      limitation is planned to be reduced in a future version of
      ModSecurity.</p></div></div><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="N11F4E"></a>Miscellaneous Topics</h2></div></div><div></div></div><p></p><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="N11F52"></a>Impedance Mismatch</h3></div></div><div></div></div><p>Web application firewalls have a difficult job trying to make
      sense of data that passes by, without any knowledge of the application
      and its business logic. The protection they provide comes from having an
      independent layer of security on the outside. Because data validation is
      done twice, security can be increased without having to touch the
      application. In some cases, however, the fact that everything is done
      twice brings problems. Problems can arise in the areas where the
      communication protocols are not well specified, or where either the
      device or the application do things that are not in the specification.
      In such cases it may be possible to design payload that will be
      interpreted in one way by one device and in another by the other device.
      This problem is better known as Impedance Mismatch. It can be exploited
      to evade the security devices.</p><p>While we will continue to enhance ModSecurity to deal with various
      evasion techniques the problem can only be minimized, but never solved.
      With so many different application backend chances are some will always
      do something completely unexpected. The only solution is to be aware of
      the technologies in the backend when writing rules, adapting the rules
      to remove the mismatch. See the next section for some examples.</p><div class="section" lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="N11F59"></a>PHP Peculiarities for ModSecurity Users</h4></div></div><div></div></div><p>When writing rules to protect PHP applications you need to pay
        attention to the following facts:</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><p>When "register_globals" is set to "On" request parameters
            are automatically converted to script variables. In some PHP
            versions it is even possible to override the $GLOBALS
            array.</p></li><li><p>Whitespace at the beginning of parameter names is ignored.
            (This is very dangerous if you are writing rules to target
            specific named variables.)</p></li><li><p>The remaining whitespace (in parameter names) is converted
            to underscores. The same applies to dots and to a "[" if the
            variable name does not contain a matching closing bracket.
            (Meaning that if you want to exploit a script through a variable
            that contains an underscore in the name you can send a parameter
            with a whitespace or a dot instead.)</p></li><li><p>Cookies can be treated as request parameters.</p></li><li><p>The discussion about variable names applies equally to the
            cookie names.</p></li><li><p>The order in which parameters are taken from the request and
            the environment is EGPCS (environment, GET, POST, Cookies,
            built-in variables). This means that a POST parameter will
            overwrite the parameters transported on the request line (in
            QUERY_STRING).</p></li><li><p>When "magic_quotes_gpc" is set to "On" PHP will use
            backslash to escape the following characters: single quote, double
            quote, backslash, and the nul byte.</p></li><li><p>If "magic_quotes_sybase" is set to "On" only the single
            quote will be escaped using another single quote. In this case the
            "magic_quotes_gpc" setting becomes irrelevant. The
            "magic_quotes_sybase" setting completely overrides the
            "magic_quotes_gpc" behaviour but "magic_quotes_gpc" still must be
            set to "On" for the Sybase-specific quoting to be work.</p></li><li><p>PHP will also automatically create nested arrays for you.
            For example "p[x][y]=1" results in a total of three
            variables.</p></li></ol></div></div></div></div></div><div align="center" class="copyright">Copyright (C) 2004-2010 <a href="http://www.breach.com">Breach Security</a></div></body></html>