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pdns-3.3.3-1.mga4.x86_64.rpm

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<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>7. PowerDNS Security Advisory 2008-01: System random generator can be predicted, leading to the potential to 'spoof' PowerDNS Recursor</title><link rel="stylesheet" href="docbook.css" type="text/css" /><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2" /><link rel="home" href="index.html" title="PowerDNS manual" /><link rel="up" href="powerdns.html" title="Chapter 1. The PowerDNS dynamic nameserver" /><link rel="prev" href="powerdns-advisory-2006-02.html" title="6. PowerDNS Security Advisory 2006-02: Zero second CNAME TTLs can make PowerDNS exhaust allocated stack space, and crash" /><link rel="next" href="powerdns-advisory-2008-02.html" title="8. PowerDNS Security Advisory 2008-02: By not responding to certain queries, domains become easier to spoof" /></head><body><div class="navheader"><table width="100%" summary="Navigation header"><tr><th colspan="3" align="center">7. PowerDNS Security Advisory 2008-01: System random generator can be predicted, leading to the potential to 'spoof' PowerDNS Recursor</th></tr><tr><td width="20%" align="left"><a accesskey="p" href="powerdns-advisory-2006-02.html">Prev</a> </td><th width="60%" align="center">Chapter 1. The PowerDNS dynamic nameserver</th><td width="20%" align="right"> <a accesskey="n" href="powerdns-advisory-2008-02.html">Next</a></td></tr></table><hr /></div><div class="sect1" title="7. PowerDNS Security Advisory 2008-01: System random generator can be predicted, leading to the potential to 'spoof' PowerDNS Recursor"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="powerdns-advisory-2008-01"></a>7. PowerDNS Security Advisory 2008-01: System random generator can be predicted, leading to the potential to 'spoof' PowerDNS Recursor</h2></div></div></div><p>
	</p><div class="table"><a id="idp7625952"></a><p class="title"><b>Table 1.3. PowerDNS Security Advisory</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="PowerDNS Security Advisory" border="1"><colgroup><col /><col /></colgroup><tbody><tr><td>
		  CVE
		</td><td>
		  Not yet assigned
		</td></tr><tr><td>
		  Date
		</td><td>
		  31st of March 2008
		</td></tr><tr><td>
		  Affects
		</td><td>
		  PowerDNS Recursor versions 3.1.4 and earlier, on most operating systems
		</td></tr><tr><td>
		  Not affected
		</td><td>
		  No versions of the PowerDNS Authoritative Server ('pdns_server') are affected.
		</td></tr><tr><td>
		  Severity 
		</td><td>
		  Moderate
		</td></tr><tr><td>
		  Impact
		</td><td>
		  Data manipulation; client redirection
		</td></tr><tr><td>
		  Exploit
		</td><td>
		  This problem can be triggered by sending queries for specifically configured domains, sending
		  spoofed answer packets immediately afterwards.
		</td></tr><tr><td>
		  Solution
		</td><td>
		  Upgrade to PowerDNS Recursor 3.1.5, or apply changesets <a class="ulink" href="http://wiki.powerdns.com/projects/trac/changeset/1159" target="_top">1159</a>, <a class="ulink" href="http://wiki.powerdns.com/projects/trac/changeset/1160" target="_top">1160</a> and <a class="ulink" href="http://wiki.powerdns.com/projects/trac/changeset/1164" target="_top">1164</a>.
		</td></tr><tr><td>
		  Workaround
		</td><td>
		  None known. Exposure can be limited by configuring the <span class="command"><strong>allow-from</strong></span> setting so only trusted users
		  can query your nameserver.
		</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><p><br class="table-break" />
      </p><p>
	We would like to thank Amit Klein of Trusteer for bringing a serious           
	vulnerability to our attention which would enable a smart attacker to          
	'spoof' previous versions of the PowerDNS Recursor into accepting possibly     
	malicious data.     
      </p><p>
	Details can be found on <a class="ulink" href="http://www.trusteer.com/docs/powerdnsrecursor.html" target="_top">
	  this Trusteer page</a>.
      </p><p>
	This security problem was announced in <a class="ulink" href="http://mailman.powerdns.com/pipermail/pdns-users/2008-March/005279.html" target="_top">this email message</a>.
      </p><p>
	It is recommended that all users of the PowerDNS Recursor upgrade to 3.1.5
	as soon as practicable, while we simultaneously note that busy servers are
	less susceptible to the attack, but not immune.
      </p><p>
	The vulnerability is present on all operating systems where the behaviour      
	of the libc random() function can be predicted based on its past output.     
	This includes at least all known versions of Linux, as well as Microsoft       
	Windows, and probably FreeBSD and Solaris.
      </p><p>
	The magnitude of this vulnerability depends on internal details of the         
	system random() generator. For Linux, the mathematics of the random            
	generator are complex, but well understood and Amit Klein has written and      
	published a proof of concept that can successfully predict its output after     
	uninterrupted observation of 40-50 DNS queries.
      </p><p>
	Because the observation needs to be uninterrupted, busy PowerDNS Recursor      
	instances are harder to subvert - other data is highly likely to be            
	interleaved with traffic generated by an attacker. 
      </p><p>
	Nevertheless, operators are urged to update at their earliest convenience.
      </p></div><div class="navfooter"><hr /><table width="100%" summary="Navigation footer"><tr><td width="40%" align="left"><a accesskey="p" href="powerdns-advisory-2006-02.html">Prev</a> </td><td width="20%" align="center"><a accesskey="u" href="powerdns.html">Up</a></td><td width="40%" align="right"> <a accesskey="n" href="powerdns-advisory-2008-02.html">Next</a></td></tr><tr><td width="40%" align="left" valign="top">6. PowerDNS Security Advisory 2006-02: Zero second CNAME TTLs can make PowerDNS exhaust allocated stack space, and crash </td><td width="20%" align="center"><a accesskey="h" href="index.html">Home</a></td><td width="40%" align="right" valign="top"> 8. PowerDNS Security Advisory 2008-02: By not responding to certain queries, domains become easier to spoof</td></tr></table></div></body></html>