# -*- text -*-
##
##  eap.conf -- Configuration for EAP types (PEAP, TTLS, etc.)
##
##	$Id: 36849e10f284fa34d43fd0d31358dd2699758625 $

#######################################################################
#
#  Whatever you do, do NOT set 'Auth-Type := EAP'.  The server
#  is smart enough to figure this out on its own.  The most
#  common side effect of setting 'Auth-Type := EAP' is that the
#  users then cannot use ANY other authentication method.
#
eap {
	#  Invoke the default supported EAP type when
	#  EAP-Identity response is received.
	#
	#  The incoming EAP messages DO NOT specify which EAP
	#  type they will be using, so it MUST be set here.
	#
	#  For now, only one default EAP type may be used at a time.
	#
	#  If the EAP-Type attribute is set by another module,
	#  then that EAP type takes precedence over the
	#  default type configured here.
	#
	default_eap_type = md5

	#  A list is maintained to correlate EAP-Response
	#  packets with EAP-Request packets.  After a
	#  configurable length of time, entries in the list
	#  expire, and are deleted.
	#
	timer_expire = 60

	#  There are many EAP types, but the server has support
	#  for only a limited subset.  If the server receives
	#  a request for an EAP type it does not support, then
	#  it normally rejects the request.  By setting this
	#  configuration to "yes", you can tell the server to
	#  instead keep processing the request.  Another module
	#  MUST then be configured to proxy the request to
	#  another RADIUS server which supports that EAP type.
	#
	#  If another module is NOT configured to handle the
	#  request, then the request will still end up being
	#  rejected.
	#
	ignore_unknown_eap_types = no

	# Cisco AP1230B firmware 12.2(13)JA1 has a bug.  When given
	# a User-Name attribute in an Access-Accept, it copies one
	# more byte than it should.
	#
	# We can work around it by configurably adding an extra
	# zero byte.
	#
	cisco_accounting_username_bug = no

	#  Help prevent DoS attacks by limiting the number of
	#  sessions that the server is tracking.  For simplicity,
	#  this is taken from the "max_requests" directive in
	#  radiusd.conf.
	#
	max_sessions = ${max_requests}


	############################################################
	#
	#  Supported EAP-types
	#


	#  EAP-MD5
	#
	#  We do NOT recommend using EAP-MD5 authentication
	#  for wireless connections.  It is insecure, and does
	#  not provide for dynamic WEP keys.
	#
	md5 {
	}


	#  EAP-pwd -- secure password-based authentication
	#
	#pwd {
	#	group = 19

	#	server_id = theserver@example.com

		#  This has the same meaning as for TLS.
		#
	#	fragment_size = 1020

		# The virtual server which determines the
		# "known good" password for the user.
		# Note that unlike TLS, only the "authorize"
		# section is processed.  EAP-PWD requests can be
		# distinguished by having a User-Name, but
		# no User-Password, CHAP-Password, EAP-Message, etc.
		#
	#	virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"
	#}


	#  Cisco LEAP
	#
	#  We do not recommend using LEAP in new deployments.  See:
	#  http://www.securiteam.com/tools/5TP012ACKE.html
	#
	#  Cisco LEAP uses the MS-CHAP algorithm (but not
	#  the MS-CHAP attributes) to perform it's authentication.
	#
	#  As a result, LEAP *requires* access to the plain-text
	#  User-Password, or the NT-Password attributes.
	#  'System' authentication is impossible with LEAP.
	#
	leap {
	}


	#  EAP-GTC -- Generic Token Card
	#
	#  Currently, this is only permitted inside of EAP-TTLS,
	#  or EAP-PEAP.  The module "challenges" the user with
	#  text, and the response from the user is taken to be
	#  the User-Password.
	#
	#  Proxying the tunneled EAP-GTC session is a bad idea,
	#  the users password will go over the wire in plain-text,
	#  for anyone to see.
	#
	gtc {
		#  The default challenge, which many clients
		#  ignore..
		#
	#	challenge = "Password: "

		#  The plain-text response which comes back
		#  is put into a User-Password attribute,
		#  and passed to another module for
		#  authentication.  This allows the EAP-GTC
		#  response to be checked against plain-text,
		#  or crypt'd passwords.
		#
		#  If you say "Local" instead of "PAP", then
		#  the module will look for a User-Password
		#  configured for the request, and do the
		#  authentication itself.
		#
		auth_type = PAP
	}


	#  Common TLS configuration for TLS-based EAP types
	#  ------------------------------------------------
	#
	#  See raddb/certs/README for additional comments
	#  on certificates.
	#
	#  If OpenSSL was not found at the time the server was
	#  built, the "tls", "ttls", and "peap" sections will
	#  be ignored.
	#
	#  If you do not currently have certificates signed by
	#  a trusted CA you may use the 'snakeoil' certificates.
	#  Included with the server in raddb/certs.
	#
	#  If these certificates have not been auto-generated:
	#    cd raddb/certs
	#    make
	#
	#  These test certificates SHOULD NOT be used in a normal
	#  deployment.  They are created only to make it easier
	#  to install the server, and to perform some simple
	#  tests with EAP-TLS, TTLS, or PEAP.
	#
	#  Note that you should NOT use a globally known CA here!
	#  e.g. using a Verisign cert as a "known CA" means that
	#  ANYONE who has a certificate signed by them can
	#  authenticate via EAP-TLS!  This is likely not what you want.
	#
	tls-config tls-common {
		private_key_password =
		private_key_file = ${system_ssldir}/private/radiusd.pem

		#  If Private key & Certificate are located in
		#  the same file, then private_key_file &
		#  certificate_file must contain the same file
		#  name.
		#
		#  If ca_file (below) is not used, then the
		#  certificate_file below SHOULD also include all of
		#  the intermediate CA certificates used to sign the
		#  server certificate, but NOT the root CA.
		#
		#  Including the ROOT CA certificate is not useful and
		#  merely inflates the exchanged data volume during
		#  the TLS negotiation.
		#
		#  This file should contain the server certificate,
		#  followed by intermediate certificates, in order.
		#  i.e. If we have a server certificate signed by CA1,
		#  which is signed by CA2, which is signed by a root
		#  CA, then the "certificate_file" should contain
		#  server.pem, followed by CA1.pem, followed by
		#  CA2.pem.
		#
		#  When using "ca_file" or "ca_dir", the
		#  "certificate_file" should contain only
		#  "server.pem".  And then you may (or may not) need
		#  to set "auto_chain", depending on your version of
		#  OpenSSL.
		#
		#  In short, SSL / TLS certificates are complex.
		#  There are many versions of software, each of which
		#  behave slightly differently.  It is impossible to
		#  give advice which will work everywhere.  Instead,
		#  we give general guidelines.
		#
		certificate_file = ${system_ssldir}/certs/radiusd.pem

		#  Trusted Root CA list
		#
		#  This file can contain multiple CA certificates.
		#  ALL of the CA's in this list will be trusted to
		#  issue client certificates for authentication.
		#
		#  In general, you should use self-signed
		#  certificates for 802.1x (EAP) authentication.
		#  In that case, this CA file should contain
		#  *one* CA certificate.
		#
		ca_file = ${system_ssldir}/certs/ca-bundle.crt

	 	#  OpenSSL will automatically create certificate chains,
	 	#  unless we tell it to not do that.  The problem is that
	 	#  it sometimes gets the chains right from a certificate
	 	#  signature view, but wrong from the clients view.
		#
		#  When setting "auto_chain = no", the server certificate
		#  file MUST include the full certificate chain.
		#
	#	auto_chain = yes

		#  If OpenSSL supports TLS-PSK, then we can use a
		#  fixed PSK identity and (hex) password.  As of
		#  3.0.18, these can be used at the same time as the
		#  certificate configuration, but only for TLS 1.0
		#  through 1.2.
		#
		#  If PSK and certificates are configured at the same
		#  time for TLS 1.3, then the server will warn you,
		#  and will disable TLS 1.3, as it will not work.
		#
		#  The work around is to have two modules (or for
		#  RadSec, two listen sections).  One will have PSK
		#  configured, and the other will have certificates
		#  configured.
		#
	#	psk_identity = "test"
	#	psk_hexphrase = "036363823"

		#  Dynamic queries for the PSK.  If TLS-PSK is used,
		#  and psk_query is set, then you MUST NOT use
		#  psk_identity or psk_hexphrase.
		#
		#  Instead, use a dynamic expansion similar to the one
		#  below.  It keys off of TLS-PSK-Identity.  It should
		#  return a of string no more than 512 hex characters.
		#  That string will be converted to binary, and will
		#  be used as the dynamic PSK hexphrase.
		#
		#  Note that this query is just an example.  You will
		#  need to customize it for your installation.
		#
	#	psk_query = "%{sql:select hex(key) from psk_keys where keyid = '%{TLS-PSK-Identity}'}"

		#  For DH cipher suites to work, you have to
		#  run OpenSSL to create the DH file first:
		#
		#    openssl dhparam -out certs/dh 2048
		#
		dh_file = ${local_ssldir}/dh

		#  If your system doesn't have /dev/urandom,
		#  you will need to create this file, and
		#  periodically change its contents.
		#
		#  For security reasons, FreeRADIUS doesn't
		#  write to files in its configuration
		#  directory.
		#
	#	random_file = /dev/urandom

		#  This can never exceed the size of a RADIUS
		#  packet (4096 bytes), and is preferably half
		#  that, to accommodate other attributes in
		#  RADIUS packet.  On most APs the MAX packet
		#  length is configured between 1500 - 1600
		#  In these cases, fragment size should be
		#  1024 or less.
		#
	#	fragment_size = 1024

		#  include_length is a flag which is
		#  by default set to yes If set to
		#  yes, Total Length of the message is
		#  included in EVERY packet we send.
		#  If set to no, Total Length of the
		#  message is included ONLY in the
		#  First packet of a fragment series.
		#
	#	include_length = yes


		#  Check the Certificate Revocation List
		#
		#  1) Copy CA certificates and CRLs to same directory.
		#  2) Execute 'c_rehash <CA certs&CRLs Directory>'.
		#     'c_rehash' is OpenSSL's command.
		#  3) uncomment the lines below.
		#  5) Restart radiusd
	#	check_crl = yes

		# Check if intermediate CAs have been revoked.
	#	check_all_crl = yes

		ca_path = ${local_ssldir}

		# Accept an expired Certificate Revocation List
		#
	#	allow_expired_crl = no

		#  If check_cert_issuer is set, the value will
		#  be checked against the DN of the issuer in
		#  the client certificate.  If the values do not
		#  match, the certificate verification will fail,
		#  rejecting the user.
		#
		#  This check can be done more generally by checking
		#  the value of the TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer attribute.
		#  This check can be done via any mechanism you
		#  choose.
		#
	#	check_cert_issuer = "/C=GB/ST=Berkshire/L=Newbury/O=My Company Ltd"

		#  If check_cert_cn is set, the value will
		#  be xlat'ed and checked against the CN
		#  in the client certificate.  If the values
		#  do not match, the certificate verification
		#  will fail rejecting the user.
		#
		#  This check is done only if the previous
		#  "check_cert_issuer" is not set, or if
		#  the check succeeds.
		#
		#  In 2.1.10 and later, this check can be done
		#  more generally by checking the value of the
		#  TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name attribute.  This check
		#  can be done via any mechanism you choose.
		#
	#	check_cert_cn = %{User-Name}

		#  Set this option to specify the allowed
		#  TLS cipher suites.  The format is listed
		#  in "man 1 ciphers".
		#
		#  For EAP-FAST, use "ALL:!EXPORT:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
		#
		cipher_list = "DEFAULT"

		#  If enabled, OpenSSL will use server cipher list
		#  (possibly defined by cipher_list option above)
		#  for choosing right cipher suite rather than
		#  using client-specified list which is OpenSSl default
		#  behavior.  Setting this to "yes" means that OpenSSL
		#  will choose the servers ciphers, even if they do not
		#  best match what the client sends.
		#
		#  TLS negotiation is usually good, but can be imperfect.
		#  This setting allows administrators to "fine tune" it
		#  if necessary.
		#
		cipher_server_preference = no

		#  You can selectively disable TLS versions for
		#  compatability with old client devices.
		#
		#  If your system has OpenSSL 1.1.0 or greater, do NOT
		#  use these.  Instead, set tls_min_version and
		#  tls_max_version.
		#
	#	disable_tlsv1_2 = no
	#	disable_tlsv1_1 = no
	#	disable_tlsv1 = no

		#  Set min / max TLS version.  Mainly for Debian
		#  "trusty", which disables older versions of TLS, and
		#  requires the application to manually enable them.
		#
		#  If you are running Debian trusty, you should set
		#  these options, otherwise older clients will not be
		#  able to connect.
		#
		#  Allowed values are "1.0", "1.1", and "1.2".
		#
		#  The values must be in quotes.
		#
	#	tls_min_version = "1.0"
	#	tls_max_version = "1.2"

		#  Elliptical cryptography configuration
		#
		#  Only for OpenSSL >= 0.9.8.f
		#
		ecdh_curve = "prime256v1"

		#  Session resumption / fast reauthentication
		#  cache.
		#
		#  The cache contains the following information:
		#
		#   session Id - unique identifier, managed by SSL
		#   User-Name  - from the Access-Accept
		#   Stripped-User-Name - from the Access-Request
		#   Cached-Session-Policy - from the Access-Accept
		#
		#  The "Cached-Session-Policy" is the name of a
		#  policy which should be applied to the cached
		#  session.  This policy can be used to assign
		#  VLANs, IP addresses, etc.  It serves as a useful
		#  way to re-apply the policy from the original
		#  Access-Accept to the subsequent Access-Accept
		#  for the cached session.
		#
		#  On session resumption, these attributes are
		#  copied from the cache, and placed into the
		#  reply list.
		#
		#  You probably also want "use_tunneled_reply = yes"
		#  when using fast session resumption.
		#
		cache {
			#  Enable it.  The default is "no". Deleting the entire "cache"
			#  subsection also disables caching.
			#
			#  As of version 3.0.14, the session cache requires the use
			#  of the "name" and "persist_dir" configuration items, below.
			#
			#  The internal OpenSSL session cache has been permanently
			#  disabled.
			#
			#  You can disallow resumption for a particular user by adding the
			#  following attribute to the control item list:
			#
			#    Allow-Session-Resumption = No
			#
			#  If "enable = no" below, you CANNOT enable resumption for just one
			#  user by setting the above attribute to "yes".
			#
			enable = no

			#  Lifetime of the cached entries, in hours. The sessions will be
			#  deleted/invalidated after this time.
			#
			lifetime = 24 # hours

			#  Internal "name" of the session cache. Used to
			#  distinguish which TLS context sessions belong to.
			#
			#  The server will generate a random value if unset.
			#  This will change across server restart so you MUST
			#  set the "name" if you want to persist sessions (see
			#  below).
			#
		#	name = "EAP module"

			#  Simple directory-based storage of sessions.
			#  Two files per session will be written, the SSL
			#  state and the cached VPs. This will persist session
			#  across server restarts.
			#
			#  The default directory is ${logdir}, for historical
			#  reasons.  You should ${db_dir} instead.  And check
			#  the value of db_dir in the main radiusd.conf file.
			#  It should not point to ${raddb}
			#
			#  The server will need write perms, and the directory
			#  should be secured from anyone else. You might want
			#  a script to remove old files from here periodically:
			#
			#    find ${logdir}/tlscache -mtime +2 -exec rm -f {} \;
			#
			#  This feature REQUIRES "name" option be set above.
			#
		#	persist_dir = "${logdir}/tlscache"
		}

		#  As of version 2.1.10, client certificates can be
		#  validated via an external command.  This allows
		#  dynamic CRLs or OCSP to be used.
		#
		#  This configuration is commented out in the
		#  default configuration.  Uncomment it, and configure
		#  the correct paths below to enable it.
		#
		#  If OCSP checking is enabled, and the OCSP checks fail,
		#  the verify section is not run.
		#
		#  If OCSP checking is disabled, the verify section is
		#  run on successful certificate validation.
		#
		verify {
			#  If the OCSP checks succeed, the verify section
			#  is run to allow additional checks.
			#
			#  If you want to skip verify on OCSP success,
			#  uncomment this configuration item, and set it
			#  to "yes".
			#
		#	skip_if_ocsp_ok = no

			#  A temporary directory where the client
			#  certificates are stored.  This directory
			#  MUST be owned by the UID of the server,
			#  and MUST not be accessible by any other
			#  users.  When the server starts, it will do
			#  "chmod go-rwx" on the directory, for
			#  security reasons.  The directory MUST
			#  exist when the server starts.
			#
			#  You should also delete all of the files
			#  in the directory when the server starts.
			#
		#	tmpdir = /tmp/radiusd

			#  The command used to verify the client cert.
			#  We recommend using the OpenSSL command-line
			#  tool.
			#
			#  The ${..ca_path} text is a reference to
			#  the ca_path variable defined above.
			#
			#  The %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename} is the name
			#  of the temporary file containing the cert
			#  in PEM format.  This file is automatically
			#  deleted by the server when the command
			#  returns.
			#
		#	client = "/path/to/openssl verify -CApath ${..ca_path} %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename}"
		}

		#  OCSP Configuration
		#
		#  Certificates can be verified against an OCSP
		#  Responder. This makes it possible to immediately
		#  revoke certificates without the distribution of
		#  new Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
		#
		ocsp {
			#  Enable it.  The default is "no".
			#  Deleting the entire "ocsp" subsection
			#  also disables ocsp checking
			#
			enable = no

			#  The OCSP Responder URL can be automatically
			#  extracted from the certificate in question.
			#  To override the OCSP Responder URL set
			#  "override_cert_url = yes".
			#
			override_cert_url = yes

			#  If the OCSP Responder address is not extracted from
			#  the certificate, the URL can be defined here.
			#
			url = "http://127.0.0.1/ocsp/"

			# If the OCSP Responder can not cope with nonce
			# in the request, then it can be disabled here.
			#
			# For security reasons, disabling this option
			# is not recommended as nonce protects against
			# replay attacks.
			#
			# Note that Microsoft AD Certificate Services OCSP
			# Responder does not enable nonce by default. It is
			# more secure to enable nonce on the responder than
			# to disable it in the query here.
			# See http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc770413%28WS.10%29.aspx
			#
		#	use_nonce = yes

			# Number of seconds before giving up waiting
			# for OCSP response. 0 uses system default.
			#
		#	timeout = 0

			# Normally an error in querying the OCSP
			# responder (no response from server, server did
			# not understand the request, etc) will result in
			# a validation failure.
			#
			# To treat these errors as 'soft' failures and
			# still accept the certificate, enable this
			# option.
			#
			# Warning: this may enable clients with revoked
			# certificates to connect if the OCSP responder
			# is not available. Use with caution.
			#
		#	softfail = no
		}
	}


	#  EAP-TLS
	#
	#  As of Version 3.0, the TLS configuration for TLS-based
	#  EAP types is above in the "tls-config" section.
	#
	tls {
		#  Point to the common TLS configuration
		#
		tls = tls-common

		#  As part of checking a client certificate, the EAP-TLS
		#  sets some attributes such as TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name. This
		#  virtual server has access to these attributes, and can
		#  be used to accept or reject the request.
		#
	#	virtual_server = check-eap-tls
	}


	#  EAP-TTLS -- Tunneled TLS
	#
	#  The TTLS module implements the EAP-TTLS protocol,
	#  which can be described as EAP inside of Diameter,
	#  inside of TLS, inside of EAP, inside of RADIUS...
	#
	#  Surprisingly, it works quite well.
	#
	ttls {
		#  Which tls-config section the TLS negotiation parameters
		#  are in - see EAP-TLS above for an explanation.
		#
		#  In the case that an old configuration from FreeRADIUS
		#  v2.x is being used, all the options of the tls-config
		#  section may also appear instead in the 'tls' section
		#  above. If that is done, the tls= option here (and in
		#  tls above) MUST be commented out.
		#
		tls = tls-common

		#  The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type
		#  which is separate from the one for the non-tunneled
		#  EAP module.  Inside of the TTLS tunnel, we recommend
		#  using EAP-MD5.  If the request does not contain an
		#  EAP conversation, then this configuration entry is
		#  ignored.
		#
		default_eap_type = md5

		#  The tunneled authentication request does not usually
		#  contain useful attributes like 'Calling-Station-Id',
		#  etc.  These attributes are outside of the tunnel,
		#  and normally unavailable to the tunneled
		#  authentication request.
		#
		#  By setting this configuration entry to 'yes',
		#  any attribute which is NOT in the tunneled
		#  authentication request, but which IS available
		#  outside of the tunnel, is copied to the tunneled
		#  request.
		#
		#  allowed values: {no, yes}
		#
		copy_request_to_tunnel = no

		#  As of version 3.0.5, this configuration item
		#  is deprecated.  Instead, you should use
		#
		#    update outer.session-state {
		#      ...
		#    }
		#
		#  This will cache attributes for the final Access-Accept.
		#
		#  The reply attributes sent to the NAS are usually
		#  based on the name of the user 'outside' of the
		#  tunnel (usually 'anonymous').  If you want to send
		#  the reply attributes based on the user name inside
		#  of the tunnel, then set this configuration entry to
		#  'yes', and the reply to the NAS will be taken from
		#  the reply to the tunneled request.
		#
		#  allowed values: {no, yes}
		#
		use_tunneled_reply = no

		#  The inner tunneled request can be sent
		#  through a virtual server constructed
		#  specifically for this purpose.
		#
		#  A virtual server MUST be specified.
		#
		virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"

		#  This has the same meaning, and overwrites, the
		#  same field in the "tls" configuration, above.
		#  The default value here is "yes".
		#
	#	include_length = yes

		#  Unlike EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS does not require a client
		#  certificate. However, you can require one by setting the
		#  following option. You can also override this option by
		#  setting
		#
		#    EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes
		#
		#  in the control items for a request.
		#
		#  Note that the majority of supplicants do not support using a
		#  client certificate with EAP-TTLS, so this option is unlikely
		#  to be usable for most people.
		#
	#	require_client_cert = yes
	}


	#  EAP-PEAP
	#

	##################################################
	#
	#  !!!!! WARNINGS for Windows compatibility  !!!!!
	#
	##################################################
	#
	#  If you see the server send an Access-Challenge,
	#  and the client never sends another Access-Request,
	#  then
	#
	#		STOP!
	#
	#  The server certificate has to have special OID's
	#  in it, or else the Microsoft clients will silently
	#  fail.  See the "scripts/xpextensions" file for
	#  details, and the following page:
	#
	#	https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/814394/
	#
	#  If is still doesn't work, and you're using Samba,
	#  you may be encountering a Samba bug.  See:
	#
	#	https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6563
	#
	#  Note that we do not necessarily agree with their
	#  explanation... but the fix does appear to work.
	#
	##################################################

	#  The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type
	#  which is separate from the one for the non-tunneled
	#  EAP module.  Inside of the TLS/PEAP tunnel, we
	#  recommend using EAP-MS-CHAPv2.
	#
	peap {
		#  Which tls-config section the TLS negotiation parameters
		#  are in - see EAP-TLS above for an explanation.
		#
		#  In the case that an old configuration from FreeRADIUS
		#  v2.x is being used, all the options of the tls-config
		#  section may also appear instead in the 'tls' section
		#  above. If that is done, the tls= option here (and in
		#  tls above) MUST be commented out.
		#
		tls = tls-common

		#  The tunneled EAP session needs a default
		#  EAP type which is separate from the one for
		#  the non-tunneled EAP module.  Inside of the
		#  PEAP tunnel, we recommend using MS-CHAPv2,
		#  as that is the default type supported by
		#  Windows clients.
		#
		default_eap_type = mschapv2

		#  The PEAP module also has these configuration
		#  items, which are the same as for TTLS.
		#
		copy_request_to_tunnel = no

		#  As of version 3.0.5, this configuration item
		#  is deprecated.  Instead, you should use
		#
		#    update outer.session-state {
		#      ...
		#    }
		#
		#  This will cache attributes for the final Access-Accept.
		#
		use_tunneled_reply = no

		#  When the tunneled session is proxied, the
		#  home server may not understand EAP-MSCHAP-V2.
		#  Set this entry to "no" to proxy the tunneled
		#  EAP-MSCHAP-V2 as normal MSCHAPv2.
		#
	#	proxy_tunneled_request_as_eap = yes

		#  The inner tunneled request can be sent
		#  through a virtual server constructed
		#  specifically for this purpose.
		#
		#  A virtual server MUST be specified.
		#
		virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"

		#  This option enables support for MS-SoH
		#  see doc/SoH.txt for more info.
		#  It is disabled by default.
		#
	#	soh = yes

		#  The SoH reply will be turned into a request which
		#  can be sent to a specific virtual server:
		#
	#	soh_virtual_server = "soh-server"

		#  Unlike EAP-TLS, PEAP does not require a client certificate.
		#  However, you can require one by setting the following
		#  option. You can also override this option by setting
		#
		#    EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes
		#
		#  in the control items for a request.
		#
		#  Note that the majority of supplicants do not support using a
		#  client certificate with PEAP, so this option is unlikely to
		#  be usable for most people.
		#
	#	require_client_cert = yes
	}


	#  EAP-MSCHAPv2
	#
	#  Note that it is the EAP MS-CHAPv2 sub-module, not
	#  the main 'mschap' module.
	#
	#  Note also that in order for this sub-module to work,
	#  the main 'mschap' module MUST ALSO be configured.
	#
	#  This module is the *Microsoft* implementation of MS-CHAPv2
	#  in EAP.  There is another (incompatible) implementation
	#  of MS-CHAPv2 in EAP by Cisco, which FreeRADIUS does not
	#  currently support.
	#
	mschapv2 {
		#  Prior to version 2.1.11, the module never
		#  sent the MS-CHAP-Error message to the
		#  client.  This worked, but it had issues
		#  when the cached password was wrong.  The
		#  server *should* send "E=691 R=0" to the
		#  client, which tells it to prompt the user
		#  for a new password.
		#
		#  The default is to behave as in 2.1.10 and
		#  earlier, which is known to work.  If you
		#  set "send_error = yes", then the error
		#  message will be sent back to the client.
		#  This *may* help some clients work better,
		#  but *may* also cause other clients to stop
		#  working.
		#
	#	send_error = no

		#  Server identifier to send back in the challenge.
		#  This should generally be the host name of the
		#  RADIUS server.  Or, some information to uniquely
		#  identify it.
		#
	#	identity = "FreeRADIUS"
	}


	#  EAP-FAST
	#
	#  The FAST module implements the EAP-FAST protocol
	#
	#fast {
		#  Point to the common TLS configuration
		#
	#	tls = tls-common

		#  If 'cipher_list' is set here, it will over-ride the
		#  'cipher_list' configuration from the 'tls-common'
		#  configuration.  The EAP-FAST module has it's own
		#  over-ride for 'cipher_list' because the
		#  specifications mandata a different set of ciphers
		#  than are used by the other EAP methods.
		#
		#  cipher_list though must include "ADH" for anonymous provisioning.
		#  This is not as straight forward as appending "ADH" alongside
		#  "DEFAULT" as "DEFAULT" contains "!aNULL" so instead it is
		#  recommended "ALL:!EXPORT:!eNULL:!SSLv2" is used
		#
		#  Note - for OpenSSL 1.1.0 and above you may need
		#  to add ":@SECLEVEL=0"
		#
	#	cipher_list = "ALL:!EXPORT:!eNULL:!SSLv2"

		#  PAC lifetime in seconds (default: seven days)
		#
	#	pac_lifetime = 604800

		#  Authority ID of the server
		#
		#  If you are running a cluster of RADIUS servers, you should make
		#  the value chosen here (and for "pac_opaque_key") the same on all
		#  your RADIUS servers.  This value should be unique to your
		#  installation.  We suggest using a domain name.
		#
	#	authority_identity = "1234"

		#  PAC Opaque encryption key (must be exactly 32 bytes in size)
		#
		#  This value MUST be secret, and MUST be generated using
		#  a secure method, such as via 'openssl rand -hex 32'
		#
	#	pac_opaque_key = "0123456789abcdef0123456789ABCDEF"

		#  Same as for TTLS, PEAP, etc.
		#
	#	virtual_server = inner-tunnel
	#}
}